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TAXING REALITY: RETHINKING 
PARTNERSHIP DISTRIBUTIONS 
Andrea Monroe* 
          Partnerships play an increasingly vital role in the federal income 
tax. Yet partnership taxation is deeply flawed, with complicated 
provisions that strain the voluntary compliance mechanism on which all 
federal income tax relies. This Article considers one of the most difficult 
challenges facing partnership taxation: the treatment of distributions. 
          Distributions are ubiquitous transactions that transfer cash or 
property from a partnership to a partner. Although distributions vary 
dramatically in their purpose and the kind of property involved, their 
tax treatment follows a unitary approach. The principle of 
“nonrecognition” means that distributions do not produce any 
immediate tax consequences. This nonrecognition premise has caused 
great abuse and complexity, as partnerships have used distributions as 
tax shelter vehicles, and the government has responded with narrow 
anti-abuse “fixes” that are often counterproductive. Calls to reform 
these anti-abuse provisions have been a constant presence throughout a 
half-century of tax scholarship. 
          This Article argues that the existing scholarship largely 
misconstrues the problem with partnership distributions. The core 
difficulty is the nonrecognition premise at the system’s foundation, the 
very problem that particular anti-abuse provisions were designed to 
combat. Meaningful reform of partnership distributions thus requires a 
fundamental rethinking of nonrecognition and its role in partnership 
taxation.  
          This Article offers an alternative vision of partnership 
distributions, one without the imprint of nonrecognition. It reimagines 
partnership distributions from a recognition-based perspective, which 
would ground the tax treatment of these transactions in economic 
reality. Of particular importance are liquidating distributions that 
involve the complete or partial termination of a partner’s investment in 
the partnership. Consistent with their commercial substance, 
 
 * Associate Professor of Law, Temple University; J.D. University of Michigan Law 
School; LL.M. in Taxation, New York University School of Law. Many thanks for comments on 
earlier drafts to Alice Abreu, Jane Baron, Craig Green, Anthony Infanti, Greg Mandel, and Philip 
Postlewaite. Thanks also to Andreas Andrews, Mike Belleville, Eleanor Bradley, Theresa Hearn, 
Alexandra Lastowski, Devin McCauley, and Benjamin Weiss for marvelous research assistance.  
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liquidating distributions should be treated as taxable exchanges in 
which the partner receives cash or property from the partnership in 
exchange for relinquishing her interest in the partnership and its 
underlying property. Under a recognition-based approach, partnership 
distributions would indeed look very different than they do today, 
simpler, more equitable, and more stable.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The federal income tax is undeniably complicated, too 
complicated for most taxpayers. A recent study by the Office of the 
Taxpayer Advocate found that “it takes U.S. taxpayers (both 
individuals and businesses) more than 6.1 billion hours to complete 
filings required by a tax code that contains almost four million words 
and that, on average, has more than one new provision added to it 
daily.”1 Despite these efforts, many taxpayers cannot get it right, as 
they find themselves unable to understand or apply the tax law. Other 
taxpayers find opportunity in this complexity, using it to blur the line 
between proper planning and improper abuse. 
These dynamics are even more troublesome in partnership 
taxation, which plays an increasingly vital role in the federal income 
tax system.2 In recent years, partnerships and other non-corporate 
entities have earned more than half of the business income reported 
to the federal government.3 During this same period, the number of 
partnerships increased sharply, and more businesses today operate as 
partnerships than as corporations.4 
Yet the legal complexities of partnership taxation present unique 
challenges. Subchapter K, which contains the provisions governing 
the taxation of partnerships and their partners, is distinctively 
grounded in a commitment to taxpayer flexibility. Its rules are 
 
 1. 1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., 2012 ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS (2012), available at 
www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/userfiles/file/Full-Report/Volume-1.pdf [hereinafter 2012 NTA 
Report].  
 2. In this Article, the term “partnership” is used to refer to any entity, including a limited 
liability company, electing to be treated as a partnership for federal income tax purposes. Treas. 
Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 (as amended in 2009), -2 (as amended in 2009), -3 (as amended in 2006). 
 3. See THE PRESIDENT’S ECON. RECOVERY ADVISORY BD., THE REPORT ON TAX REFORM 
OPTIONS: SIMPLIFICATION, COMPLIANCE, AND CORPORATE TAXATION 74–75 (2010), available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/PERAB_Tax_Reform_Report.pdf; 
MARK P. KEIGHTLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42359, WHO EARNS PASS-THROUGH BUSINESS 
INCOME? AN ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL TAX RETURN DATA 1 n.1 (2012), available at 
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42359.pdf; Pamela F. Olson, And Then Cnut Told Reagan . . ., 131 
TAX NOTES 993, 995 (2011). 
 4. See 2012 NTA Report, supra note 1, at 21 (noting that in 2011, 3.6 million partnership 
tax returns were filed, as compared to the 2.3 million C corporations that filed returns); INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., 2011 DATA BOOK 4–5 tbl.2, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/11databk.pdf. Additionally, the number of partnerships grew at an average annual rate of 4.7 
percent from 2001 to 2010. See Nina Shumofsky et al., Partnership Returns, 2010, 32 STAT. OF 
INCOME BULL., Fall 2012, at 79. 
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generally designed to maximize a partnership’s ability to structure its 
affairs in whatever manner the partners consider commercially 
optimal.5 This flexibility, however, has come at a steep price in the 
form of tax abuse and complexity. Partnerships have become the 
preferred vehicle for tax shelter transactions due largely to 
subchapter K’s permissive rules; and subchapter K, in turn, has 
become crowded with a complicated patchwork of provisions 
designed to combat these abusive transactions.6 A vicious cycle has 
thus emerged in partnership taxation: flexibility leads to abuse, such 
abuse triggers governmental responses that are typically complicated 
and rarely complete, and these responses inspire the next generation 
of tax shelter transactions. This cycle continues today at significant 
public cost, compromising partner compliance, government 
revenues, and subchapter K’s public legitimacy. 
This Article will consider one of subchapter K’s most difficult 
problems—the treatment of partnership distributions.7 Distributions 
are ubiquitous transactions involving the transfer of cash or property 
from a partnership to a partner. Distributions vary dramatically based 
on their purpose, the type of assets involved, and their legal effect, 
but their tax treatment largely follows a unitary approach. Consistent 
 
 5. See H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 65 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4091; S. 
REP. NO. 83-1622, at 89 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 4721; see also Mark P. 
Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K: Special Allocations, 46 TAX L. REV. 1, 1 (1999); Darryll K. 
Jones, Towards Equity and Efficiency in Partnership Allocations, 25 VA. TAX REV. 1047, 1078 
(2006); Jerome Kurtz, The Limited Liability Company and the Future of Business Taxation: A 
Comment on Professor Berger's Plan, 47 TAX L. REV. 815, 821 (1992); Lawrence Lokken, 
Taxation of Private Business Firms: Imagining a Future Without Subchapter K, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 
249, 254 (1999); George K. Yin, The Future Taxation of Private Business Firms, 4 FLA. TAX 
REV. 141, 154 (1999).  
 6. This Article adopts the following definition of a tax shelter: an abusive transaction “is a 
transaction which is designed to technically comply with the letter of the law, but which produces 
tax savings that are inappropriate to the underlying purposes of the statutory scheme and 
inconsistent with the economic reality of the transaction.” Noël B. Cunningham & James R. 
Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters, 24 VA. TAX REV. 1, 20 (2004); Alan Gunn, The Use and 
Misuse of Antiabuse Rules: Lessons from the Partnership Antiabuse Regulations, 54 SMU L. 
REV. 159, 164 (2001). 
 7. One might wonder why partnership distributions have received so little attention 
throughout the years. Professor William Andrews proposed the following answer: “Likely 
reasons in fact why distributions have not been a matter of legislative attention in their own right 
are (1) the relative complexity of the problems presented by distributions (of which persistent 
readers will soon have ample experience), and (2) the tendency to analyze, teach and study 
partnership problems chronologically over the life of a hypothetical partnership, so that 
contributions come relatively early while distributions are only reached relatively late when 
analyst, teacher and student are all exhausted.” William D. Andrews, Inside Basis Adjustments 
and Hot Asset Exchanges in Partnership Distributions, 47 TAX L. REV. 3, 7 n.20 (1991). 
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with subchapter K’s commitment to flexibility, distributions are 
generally treated as “nonrecognition” events.8 That is, distributions 
do not trigger any immediate tax consequences for the partnership or 
the distributee partner. This policy has led to great abuse, with 
partnerships often using distributions as tax shelter vehicles. In the 
past half-century, Congress and the Department of the Treasury 
(“Treasury”) have responded to abusive distributions with 
complicated “fixes,” each working to prevent particular abuses 
without infringing on legitimate partnership transactions. 
The section 751(b) disproportionate distribution rule is the most 
important of these fixes, standing as the primary bulwark against 
abusive distributions.9 It is also one of subchapter K’s most highly 
criticized provisions. Section 751(b)’s complexity is matchless, as it 
involves a seven-step computational process that includes three 
fictional transactions between the distributee partner and the 
partnership.10 Even so, the provision fails to prevent many of the 
abuses that it was designed to eliminate. Calls for reforming or 
repealing section 751(b) have thus continued from the provision’s 
codification in 1954 to the present.11 
This Article argues that section 751(b)’s critics have 
misconstrued the problem. Section 751(b) is not the problem with 
 
 8. I.R.C. § 731(a)–(b) (2006). 
 9. Andrews, supra note 7, at 4.  
 10. WILLIAM S. MCKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS 
¶ 21.03 (4th ed. 2007). 
 11. See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT—TAXATION OF PRIVATE 
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: MEMORANDUM NO. 3 65–77 (1997) [hereinafter AM. LAW INST., 
MEMORANDUM NO. 3]; AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT—SUBCHAPTER K: 
PROPOSALS ON THE TAXATION OF PARTNERS 51–55 (1984) [hereinafter AM. LAW INST., 
SUBCHAPTER K PROJECT]; AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF TAXATION, TAX SECTION 
RECOMMENDATION NO. 1974–11, reprinted in Committee on Partnerships, 27 TAX LAW. 839, 
842, 876 (1974); STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 86TH CONG., 
SUMMARY OF THE SUBCHAPTER K ADVISORY GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS ON PARTNERS AND 
PARTNERSHIPS 40 (1959); Andrews, supra note 7, at 52–55; Curtis J. Berger, W(h)ither 
Partnership Taxation?, 47 TAX L. REV. 105, 148 (1991); Karen C. Burke, Partnership 
Distributions: Options for Reform, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 677, 713–17 (1998); James S. Eustice, 
Subchapter S Corporations and Partnerships: A Search for the Pass Through Paradigm (Some 
Preliminary Proposals), 39 TAX L. REV. 345, 381–85 (1984); Mark P. Gergen, Reforming 
Subchapter K: Contributions and Distributions, 47 TAX L. REV. 173, 200 (1991); Christopher H. 
Hanna, Partnership Distributions: Whatever Happened to Nonrecognition?, 82 KY. L. REV. 465, 
469–85 (1994); Philip F. Postlewaite et al., A Critique of the ALI’s Federal Income Tax Project – 
Subchapter K: Proposals on the Taxation of Partners, 75 GEO. L.J. 423, 596–611 (1986); E. 
George Rudolph, Collapsible Partnerships and Optional Basis Adjustments, 28 TAX L. REV. 211, 
217 (1957); Yin, supra note 5, at 233–38. 
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partnership distributions, despite its many technical and structural 
flaws. The problem with partnership distributions is the 
nonrecognition premise at the system’s foundation, the very problem 
that section 751(b) was designed to fix. Reforming section 751(b) is 
therefore not the answer. Meaningful reform of partnership 
distributions requires a foundational rethinking of the role of 
nonrecognition in subchapter K. A first step in this process is to 
rationalize the tax treatment of partnership distributions, aligning it 
with the economic reality of these transactions. In doing so, 
partnership distributions would become simpler and less prone to 
abuse. Indeed, reconceptualizing distributions would promote 
stability in subchapter K, grounding our thinking about this crucial 
transaction in coherent principles. 
This Article proceeds in two parts. Part II begins with an 
introduction to distributions, their persistent challenges, and their 
unique position in subchapter K. It maps the dysfunctionality of 
modern distributions, tracing the system’s flaws to the foundational 
premise at its core—nonrecognition. Part III proposes an alternative 
vision of partnership distributions designed to promote simplicity, 
equity, and stability in subchapter K. This approach first divides 
distributions into two categories: operating distributions and 
liquidating distributions. It then turns to the tax treatment of each 
category, proposing rules that correspond to the commercial 
substance of the underlying distribution transaction. This Article’s 
primary reforms relate to liquidating distributions, which typically 
involve the partial or complete termination of a partner’s investment 
in a partnership. Under this proposal, these distributions would be 
taxable, viewed as transactions where a partner relinquishes her 
partnership interest and, in exchange, receives cash or property from 
the partnership. 
II.  THE PROBLEM OF PARTNERSHIP DISTRIBUTIONS 
The story of partnership distributions is much like the larger 
story of subchapter K. It begins with a system designed to maximize 
partnership freedom and ends with a system that is complex, 
inequitable, and utterly dysfunctional. This part traces the evolution 
of partnership distributions from the vantage of the system’s 
foundational nonrecognition premise, analyzing the role of 
nonrecognition in the discord surrounding these transactions. 
TAXING REALITY 10/7/2014 6:48 PM 
664 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:657 
A.  Nonrecognition-Based Partnership Distributions 
When Congress codified subchapter K in 1954, it hoped to 
create a system of taxation that was flexible, simple, and fair.12 
Subchapter K’s original provisions prioritized flexibility, allowing 
partnerships to structure their affairs in whatever manner they 
considered commercially optimal.13 Simplicity was also important, 
as Congress wanted subchapter K to be accessible to all partnerships 
regardless of their sophistication level.14 Equity, in contrast, was 
largely viewed as an intrapartnership matter. Congress wanted 
partners’ relative tax burdens to be fair in light of their relative 
circumstances, but it largely considered the revenue stakes in 
subchapter K insufficiently high to warrant government 
intervention.15 In the few instances where abusive transactions posed 
a revenue threat to the federal government, however, Congress 
adopted affirmative anti-abuse provisions, thus fortifying subchapter 
K’s ability to treat partners fairly based on their relative economic 
position. 
The original provisions governing partnership distributions 
follow this model. Subchapter K’s commitment to flexibility is 
reflected in the system’s foundational nonrecognition premise.16 
Likewise, these provisions took a largely laissez-faire approach to 
equity, only focusing on abuse prevention in one particular situation. 
Simplicity, in contrast, was a different matter. As this part will 
demonstrate, partnership distributions, and subchapter K more 
generally, have never been simple. 
1.  The Basics of Subchapter K 
As a starting point, a brief introduction to partnership taxation 
may prove useful. Subchapter K is a pass-through system of taxation. 
 
 12. See H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 65 (1954); S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 89 (1954). 
 13. H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 65; S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 89. 
 14. H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 65; S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 89. 
 15. H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 65; S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 89. In the federal income tax 
context, equity is best explored through two components: horizontal equity and vertical equity. 
Horizontal equity requires that similarly situated taxpayers be taxed in the same manner. See, e.g., 
JOHN F. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 30 (1985); 
Brian Galle, Tax Fairness, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1323, 1325 (2008); Xuan-Thao Nguyen & 
Jeffrey A. Maine, Equity and Efficiency in Intellectual Property Taxation, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 
3 (2010). Vertical equity, in contrast, requires that partners with greater income be taxed more 
than those with less income. See, e.g., WITTE, supra at 30. 
 16. I.R.C. § 731(a)–(b) (2006). 
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Unlike a corporation where income is taxed to the entity and again to 
its shareholders, a partnership’s income is only subject to one level 
of tax. A partnership is not considered a taxpayer; instead, its 
partners pay tax on their shares of the partnership’s annual income.17 
Subchapter K thus performs an allocative function, dividing the 
partnership’s income among its partners.18 
This unique pass-through role raises a foundational question of 
how to think of the partnership itself for federal income tax purposes. 
In many respects, a partnership can be thought of as an aggregate of 
its owners. Under this aggregate theory, a partnership is effectively 
disregarded, with its partners treated as direct co-owners of each item 
of the partnership’s property. Yet in other respects, a partnership can 
be thought of as an entity separate and distinct from its owners. 
Under this entity theory, partners are treated like shareholders in a 
corporation, owning interests in the partnership entity itself, rather 
than interests in the partnership’s underlying property. 
Instead of adopting a uniform theory of partnerships, subchapter 
K follows both approaches, with different provisions reflecting 
different theories. On one hand, numerous computational and 
administrative provisions reflect the entity theory. For instance, a 
partnership computes its own taxable income and determines the 
character of any recognized gains or losses.19 On the other hand, 
subchapter K’s pass-through model embodies the aggregate theory, 
taxing partners directly on their share of a partnership’s income.20 
Because the aggregate theory animates subchapter K’s distinctive 
pass-through feature, the theory’s view of partners as direct co-
owners of partnership property serves as a useful touchstone when 
working through foundational issues in partnership taxation, such as 
the treatment of distributions. 
This pass-through function also highlights the deep tensions in 
subchapter K. To illustrate, imagine that A, B, and C form a 
partnership to sell goods to the public, and each partner holds an 
equal one-third interest in the partnership. C signs a major account 
 
 17. Id. § 701. Indeed, the partners are taxable annually on their share of the partnership’s 
income without regard to whether the corresponding funds are distributed to them during the 
relevant year. 
 18. Id. § 704(b). 
 19. Id. §§ 702(b), 703(a). 
 20. Id. § 701.  
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and, hence, she is responsible for virtually all of the partnership’s 
income during the current year. In light of this development, the 
partners might decide to amend their partnership agreement, 
requiring the partnership to allocate taxable income among the 
partners based on their relative sales. But the partners might also 
decide against this approach, instead retaining their equal allocation 
arrangement. Notwithstanding C’s disproportionate share of the 
partnership’s sales, subchapter K would permit the partnership to 
allocate its taxable income in this manner, one-third to each 
partner.21 
In doing so, subchapter K challenges one of the most 
foundational premises of the federal income tax—that a transaction’s 
tax consequences should match its economic consequences. Income 
is generally taxed to the person who performs the services or owns 
the property that produces that income.22 Yet a partnership seems to 
change this equation, allowing the partners to shift tax liability 
among themselves. Indeed, subchapter K allows partners to achieve 
tax results that they could not achieve in their individual capacities, 
and this freedom is largely responsible for both the popularity and 
the problems of partnership taxation. 
If left unchecked, this type of flexibility creates opportunities for 
partners to reduce their aggregate tax liability, sometimes at great 
public cost. Returning to the ABC partnership, consider the 
consequences if C were allocated one-third of the partnership’s 
taxable income but allocated an amount of its economic gain 
corresponding to her share of the partnership’s sales.23 C would 
 
 21. See Schneer v. Comm’r, 97 T.C. 643, 658 (1991) (“If partners were not able to share 
profits in an amount disproportionate to the ratio in which they earned the underlying income, the 
partnership provisions of the Code would, to some extent, be rendered unnecessary.”). 
 22. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 118 (1940) (“The power to dispose of income is 
the equivalent of ownership of it. The exercise of that power to procure the payment of income to 
another is the enjoyment, and hence the realization, of the income by him who exercises it.”); 
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114–15 (1930) (“There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries 
to those who earned them and provide that the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory 
arrangements and contracts however ‘skillfully’ devised to prevent the salary when paid from 
vesting even for a second in the man who earned it. That seems to us the import of the statute 
before us . . . .”). 
 23. Operationally, these allocations are implemented through accounts that track a partner’s 
economic and tax investments in the partnership. A partner’s economic investment in a 
partnership is measured by her “capital account.” Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv). In general 
terms, the partner’s capital account balance equals the amount that the partner is entitled to 
receive on liquidation of her partnership interest. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b)(2). A partner’s tax 
investment, in contrast, is measured by her basis in her partnership interest, referred to as “outside 
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receive the economic benefit of almost all of the partnership’s 
income, thereby entitling her to receive these funds on the liquidation 
of her partnership interest.24 But C would not bear the corresponding 
tax liability for much of this income; her partners, A and B, would. 
Put another way, A and B would bear the tax liability corresponding 
to funds earmarked for C. 
One might wonder why A and B would agree to this 
arrangement. The answer often lies in the partners’ individual tax 
rates: if C’s marginal tax rate were higher than her partners, then 
shifting the partnership’s taxable income from her to A and B would 
benefit the partnership, reducing the average tax rate applied to its 
income.25 The partnership would thus win, with the income shift 
producing a net tax savings for its partners. The federal government, 
in contrast, would lose, deprived of the tax revenues necessary to 
finance its operations. 
Because of these revenue concerns, Congress’s commitment to 
flexibility in partnership taxation could not be limitless. At some 
point, Congress had to intervene, drawing a line between permissible 
partnership transactions and impermissible tax sheltering. These 
congressional efforts have taken many forms throughout the years, 
but all have been grounded in the premise that the tax and economic 
consequences of a transaction should match.26 A partner’s economic 
 
basis,” which represents the amount of the partner’s investment in the partnership that has 
previously been subject to tax. I.R.C. § 705. 
 24. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b)(2). 
 25. To illustrate, let’s assume that the ABC partnership has $3,000 of taxable income in the 
current year. C is responsible for generating 80 percent of the underlying sales, and A and B are 
each responsible for generating 10 percent of the partnership’s sales. Let’s further assume that A’s 
and B’s individual income tax rate is 0 percent, and C’s individual income tax rate is 39.6 percent. 
If the partnership allocated its taxable income in proportion to each partner’s sales, C would be 
allocated $2,400 of taxable income ($3,000 total taxable income * 0.8 allocation ratio), and her 
resulting tax liability would be $950 ($2,400 allocated taxable income * 0.396 tax rate). A and B 
would each be allocated $300 of taxable income ($3,000 total taxable income * 0.1 allocation 
ratio), but neither partner would incur a tax liability. Taken together, the partners would pay taxes 
of $950 on taxable income of $3,000. 
If, in contrast, the partnership allocated its taxable income equally among the partners, 
the partners’ aggregate tax liability would decrease because less taxable income would be subject 
to tax at C’s 39.6 percent individual income tax rate. The partnership would now allocate $1,000 
of taxable income to C, and her resulting tax liability would be $396 ($1,000 allocated taxable 
income * 0.396 tax rate). Likewise, the partnership would allocate $1,000 of taxable income to 
both A and B, and neither partner would incur a tax liability. Accordingly, the aggregate tax 
liability of the partners would now be $396, resulting in a net tax savings of $554. 
 26. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 704(b). The provisions governing partnership allocations provide a 
useful example of this premise. As originally enacted, these provisions allowed partnerships great 
TAXING REALITY 10/7/2014 6:48 PM 
668 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:657 
investment in a partnership thus functions as a benchmark in 
subchapter K: if a partner receives an economic benefit from a 
partnership, she should also bear the corresponding tax burden.27 
Returning to the ABC partnership, one can see how subchapter 
K implements this premise. If the partners wish to share the 
partnership’s tax burden equally, then they must also share its 
economic benefits equally.28 The partnership may thus allocate  
one-third of its taxable income to C, even though she is responsible 
for a larger percentage of the partnership’s sales. This allocation, 
however, would only be permissible if the partnership were to 
allocate C one-third of the corresponding economic income. In doing 
so, C would reduce her tax liability, but at a steep price—a 
diminished share of the related economic benefit. Considered in this 
light, C’s acquiescence in this arrangement would likely stem from 
legitimate commercial considerations; perhaps each partner’s share 
of annual sales is unpredictable, fluctuating dramatically from one 
year to the next. Linking the tax and economic consequences of a 
transaction in this manner thus serves a signaling function, 
highlighting that commercial considerations, rather than tax 
sheltering, animated the partners’ arrangement.29 
This tension between flexibility and equity runs throughout 
subchapter K, shaping the rules governing every event in a 
partnership’s life. Flexibility is subchapter K’s priority, and 
partnerships have great latitude in structuring transactions. Yet 
equity is also important, guiding much of our foundational thinking 
 
freedom in allocating their taxable items so long as the resulting allocations did not have a 
principal purpose of tax avoidance or evasion. Id. § 704(b) (1954). This standards-based approach 
to partnership allocations proved problematic, and Congress ultimately amended subchapter K, 
adopting the substantial economic effect safe harbor. Id. § 704(b) (1976). Under this approach, 
the partnership’s contractual allocations will be respected to the extent they have substantial 
economic effect. Id.  
 27. I.R.C. § 704(b) (1976); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2). 
 28. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(a). This “economic effect” requirement provides that a 
partner’s capital account, which reflects her economic investment in the partnership, and a 
partner’s outside basis, which reflects her tax investment in the partnership, should move in 
unison: if a partnership allocates one dollar of economic income to a partner, as reflected in an 
increase to her capital account, then it should similarly allocate one dollar of taxable income to 
her, as reflected in an increase to her basis in her partnership interest. Id. 
 29. See, e.g., GEORGE K. YIN & DAVID J. SHAKOW, AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX 
PROJECT: TAXATION OF PRIVATE BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: REPORTERS’ STUDY (1999); Emily 
Cauble, Was Blackstone’s Initial Public Offering Too Good to be True?: A Case Study in Closing 
Loopholes in the Partnership Tax Allocation Rules, 14 FLA. TAX REV. 153, 171 (2013); Lokken, 
supra note 5, at 254; Yin, supra note 5, at 157. 
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about how partnerships should operate. Nonetheless, Congress’s 
commitment to equity was not always reflected in subchapter K’s 
provisions. Indeed, Congress considered equity an intrapartnership 
matter to be resolved by the partners themselves, only intervening in 
those rare instances where partnership inequities jeopardized federal 
revenues. 
Considered in this light, equity’s secondary role in subchapter 
K’s original provisions is best viewed as a congressional 
miscalculation. Congress underestimated the revenue cost of abusive 
partnership transactions, like the income shifting discussed in the 
preceding example.30 As a result, it left partnerships largely alone, 
unencumbered by equity-based restrictions on their freedom. It is 
through this lens that we now turn to subchapter K’s greatest 
transactional challenge—partnership distributions. 
2.  The Basics of Partnership Distributions 
Distributions are ubiquitous in the partnership world, involving 
the transfer of cash or property from a partnership to a partner.31 
Distributions, however, are not homogenous transactions; 
partnerships make distributions for numerous reasons, and their 
impact on a partnership and its partners varies accordingly. 
To illustrate, consider again the ABC partnership. During the 
partnership’s life, one could envision various events that would give 
rise to a distribution. For instance, the partnership might distribute a 
portion of its annual profits to the partners through a ratable cash 
distribution. In this scenario, the distribution represents income 
previously allocated and taxed to each partner.32 Accordingly, this 
distribution itself would not change anything among the partners; 
before and after the distribution, each partner would have a one-third 
interest in the partnership. I will refer to this type of distribution as 
an “operating distribution.” 
 
 30. See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 5, at 1; Mark P. Gergen, The End of the Revolution in 
Partnership Tax?, 56 SMU L. REV. 343, 348 (2003); Lokken, supra note 5, at 250; Andrea R. 
Monroe, Integrity in Taxation: Rethinking Partnership Taxation, 64 ALA. L. REV. 289, 307 
(2012). 
 31. In certain instances, liabilities also trigger subchapter K’s distribution provisions. If a 
partner’s share of the partnership’s liabilities decreases, such decrease is treated as a deemed cash 
distribution. I.R.C. § 752(b) (2006). 
 32. See infra notes 39–42 and accompanying text. 
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In contrast, C might wish to retire from the partnership, 
collecting her share of the partnership’s value and terminating her 
investment in the enterprise. In this instance, the partnership would 
make a distribution to C, and she would relinquish her partnership 
interest. This is an example of a “complete liquidating distribution.” 
It effects a commercially significant change in the partnership, with 
C liquidating her entire investment. In doing so, the two remaining 
partners are left as equal stakeholders in a reconstituted AB 
partnership. Indeed, it is almost as if the distribution created a new 
partnership. 
Between these extremes, various other kinds of distributions 
might occur, each marking an economic change in the partnership. 
For example, C may require a large sum of money to finance her 
son’s law school education. To this end, C might propose that she 
relinquish a portion of her partnership interest in exchange for a 
distribution. After the transaction, C would thus remain a partner, but 
her partnership interest would be reduced. Like a complete 
liquidating distribution, this “partially liquidating distribution” 
affects the economics of the partnership. Indeed, the distribution 
reconstitutes the ABC partnership, with C holding a reduced 
partnership interest and A and B each holding a proportionately 
increased partnership interest. 
Despite their diversity, subchapter K largely treats these 
distributions the same.33 Its basic provisions prioritize flexibility, 
implementing this congressional commitment through a 
nonrecognition rule. When a taxpayer disposes of property, the 
transaction ordinarily triggers the taxation of any appreciation 
 
 33. In certain instances, subchapter K divides distributions into two categories: liquidating 
distributions and current distributions. To that end, a “liquidation of a partner’s interest” in a 
partnership is defined as the termination of a partner’s entire interest in a partnership through one 
or a series of distributions. I.R.C. § 761(d). All other distributions, including partially liquidating 
distributions, are treated as current distributions. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.731-1(a)(1)(i), 1.761–1(d). In 
most instances, the separate provisions governing liquidating distributions are dictated by 
necessity, reflecting the fact that the retiring partner does not possess an interest in the partnership 
following the distribution. See I.R.C. §§ 731(a)(2) (losses recognized in certain complete 
liquidating distributions), 732(b) (basis of property distributed in a complete liquidating 
distribution). Section 736, which treats certain payments to a retiring partner as a distributive 
share of partnership income or a guaranteed payment, is the exception. Id. § 736. It is a more 
substantive partnership provision, but it only applies in limited circumstances. Id.; Philip F. 
Postlewaite & Adam H. Rosenzweig, Anachronisms in Subchapter K of the Internal Revenue 
Code: Is It Time to Part with Section 736?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 379 (2006). 
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reflected in the property.34 The amount of this taxable gain is equal 
to the difference between the property’s fair market value and its 
basis, which represents the taxpayer’s tax investment in the property 
at the time of disposition.35 In certain instances, however, Congress 
made the affirmative decision that current taxation would be 
inappropriate and instead deferred recognition of this appreciation 
until the future.36 I will refer to this unrecognized tax appreciation as 
“built-in gain.” 
Partnership distributions are one such instance. Neither the 
partnership nor the distributee partner recognizes gain on a 
distribution.37 Rather, these transactions are designed to be invisible, 
with no immediate tax consequences. Any built-in gain in the 
distributee partner’s partnership interest is thus deferred for future 
recognition when a more appropriate taxable event occurs. 
To illustrate, consider again the ABC partnership. Imagine that 
each partner contributed $100 of cash to the partnership at formation, 
and it used $10 of these funds to purchase investment property 
(“Redacre”). The partnership is successful, generating income of 
$210 in its first year of operations. The partners share this income 
equally, $70 each, and properly report such amounts on their 
respective federal income tax returns.38 Because the partnership is 
growing, it decides against making any corresponding cash 
distributions to the partners during this period. Accordingly, the 
partnership has the following balance sheet: 
 
 
 34. I.R.C. § 1001. For ease of reading, this Article discusses appreciated property and the 
recognition of gains only. Even so, the following discussion applies equally to depreciated 
property and the recognition of losses. Unless specifically provided otherwise, the reader may 
thus assume that all references to gains, built-in gains, and appreciation also encompass their loss 
equivalents. 
 35. Id. § 1001(a). 
 36. For a more detailed discussion of when nonrecognition is considered appropriate, see 
infra notes 112–14 and accompanying text. 
 37. I.R.C. § 731(a) (nonrecognition for distributee partner), (b) (nonrecognition for 
partnership). In contrast, distributions are treated as recognition events from an economic, or 
book, perspective. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(e)(1). As will be discussed, the capital account 
treatment of distributions is thus different from the corresponding tax treatment. For a more 
detailed discussion of the capital account treatment of partnership distributions, see infra notes 41 
and 45. 
 38. I.R.C. § 704(b). As a result of this income allocation, each partner would increase her 
outside basis by $70, from $100 to $170. Id. § 705(a)(1)(A). Similarly, each partner would 
increase her capital account by $70 to reflect the corresponding allocation of economic income. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b)(3). 
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Assets Basis Value Capital Basis Value 
      
Cash 500 500 A 170 200 
Redacre 10 100 B 170 200 
   C 170 200 
Total 510 600  510 600 
 
 
If the partnership distributes $10 of cash to each partner several years 
later, subchapter K would treat the transaction as a nonrecognition 
event, and no partner would recognize gain on the distribution.39 Any 
built-in gain in their respective partnership interests would instead be 
deferred for future taxation. 
The mechanism subchapter K uses to achieve this deferral is 
basis. A partner’s basis in her partnership interest, which I will refer 
to as “outside basis,” must be adjusted following a distribution to 
preserve the proper amount of built-in gain in her partnership 
interest.40 Put another way, retaining a continuous relationship 
between value and basis is necessary to ensure that any  
pre-distribution built-in gain is taxed when the underlying property is 
subsequently sold. Accordingly, a partner must reduce her outside 
basis by the amount of cash received in a distribution in order to 
preserve any built-in gain in her partnership interest.41  
Returning to the ABC partnership’s $10 cash distribution, each 
partner would reduce her outside basis by $10, from $170 to $160, as 
 
 39. I.R.C. § 731(a)(1). As will be discussed infra Part II.C, Congress has created numerous 
exceptions to this general rule, each requiring a partner to recognize gain on a distribution. One 
such exception warrants mention at this point: if a partner receives a cash distribution in excess of 
her outside basis, she is required to recognize a gain equal to such excess cash distribution. Id. 
The recognition of gain in this instance is essential because a basis adjustment cannot preserve the 
built-in gain in the distributee partner’s partnership interest. 
 40. Id. § 733. 
 41. Id. A partnership distribution is treated as a recognition event for book purposes. When a 
partner receives a distribution, she thus reduces her capital account by the amount of cash or the 
fair market value of the property received in the distribution. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-
1(b)(2)(iv)(e)(1). 
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part of the transaction.42 In doing so, the basis reduction would 
preserve the pre-distribution built-in gain in each partner’s respective 
partnership interest. Before the distribution, each partner had a $30 
built-in gain in her partnership interest, which had a fair market value 
of $200 and a basis of $170. After the distribution, each partner has 
$10 of cash and a partnership interest worth $190.43 In order to 
preserve the $30 of pre-distribution built-in gain, each partner’s 
outside basis must be reduced by $10. The partnership would thus 
have the following post-distribution balance sheet: 
 
Assets Basis Value Capital Basis Value 
      
Cash 470 470 A 160 190 
Redacre 10 100 B 160 190 
   C 160 190 
Total 480 570  480 570 
 
 
This distribution would not alter the partner’s respective interests in 
the partnership; each partner would remain an equal one-third partner 
in the partnership. It is simply a means of transferring a ratable 
portion of the partnership’s previously taxed income to each 
partner.44 Considered in this light, treating this type of operating 
distribution as a nonrecognition transaction is entirely consistent with 
subchapter K’s pass-through function, ensuring a single level of tax 
on the partnership’s income. 
Subchapter K’s distribution provisions become more 
challenging when the distribution involves appreciated property. The 
 
 42. I.R.C. § 733. In this instance, C would also reduce her capital account by $10, the 
amount of cash received in the distribution. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(e)(1). 
 43. The $10 cash distribution reduced the fair market value of each partner’s partnership 
interest by $10, from $200 to $190. 
 44. Since its formation, the partnership has earned $210 of taxable income, and each partner 
has paid tax on her $70 allocated share of such income. The $10 cash distribution is best viewed 
as the transfer of a portion of these previously taxed funds to the partners that incurred the 
corresponding tax liability. 
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provisions remain grounded in nonrecognition; hence, any built-in 
gains will be deferred until a future disposition occurs. But 
subchapter K’s nonrecognition premise must now operate at two 
levels—the partnership level and the partner level—in each case 
deferring the proper amount of pre-distribution built-in gain through 
basis adjustments. 
At the partnership level, a distribution of property will not 
trigger immediate taxation of any built-in gain in the distributed 
property to the partnership.45 This built-in gain will instead be 
deferred, recognized by the distributee partner on a future disposition 
of the distributed property. To implement this nonrecognition rule, 
the distributee partner takes a basis in the distributed property equal 
to the partnership’s basis in the property immediately before the 
transaction.46 In doing so, subchapter K ensures the requisite  
continuity in the relationship between the distributed property’s fair 
market value and basis, thus preserving the aggregate amount of  
pre-distribution built-in gain. 
To illustrate, let’s return to the ABC partnership. This time, let’s 
assume that C requires funds to finance her son’s law school 
education, and she wishes to reduce her interest in the partnership 
through a partially liquidating distribution. The partnership therefore 
distributes Redacre to her and, in exchange, reduces her partnership 
interest from one-third to one-fifth.47 Immediately before the 
 
 45. I.R.C. § 731(b). As previously noted, the capital account treatment of distributions is 
different, grounded in a recognition rule. When a partnership distributes property to a partner, any 
economic appreciation reflected in the property is recognized by the partnership and allocated 
among all the partners based on their pre-distribution sharing arrangement, thereby increasing 
each partner’s capital account. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(e)(1). Once the partnership makes 
this adjustment, it then reduces the distributee partner’s capital account by the fair market value 
of the distributed property. Id. 
 46. I.R.C. § 732(a)(1). There is, however, a limitation on this “transferred” basis rule. The 
basis a distributee partner takes in the distributed property may not exceed the difference between 
her pre-distribution outside basis and the amount, if any, of cash received in the distribution. Id. 
§ 732(a)(2). If this limitation applies, the distributee partner’s basis in the distributed property 
will not equal the partnership’s pre-distribution basis in such property; hence, the basis 
adjustment will not succeed in preserving all of the built-in gain in the distributed property. For a 
discussion of the challenges created by this “loss” of partnership basis, see infra note 121. 
 47. Before the distribution, the partnership is worth $600; it holds $500 in cash and Redacre 
with a fair market value of $100. C’s partnership interest, in turn, has a fair market value of $200. 
Accordingly, C’s interest in the partnership would be a one-third interest ($200 fair market value 
of partnership interest / $600 fair market value of partnership). After the distribution, the 
partnership is worth only $500, having distributed Redacre to C. Likewise, the receipt of Redacre 
reduced the fair market value of C’s partnership interest by $100, from $200 to $100. C’s interest 
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distribution, the partnership has the following balance sheet: 
 
Assets Basis Value Capital Basis  Value 
      
Cash 500 500 A 170 200 
Redacre 10 100 B 170 200 
   C 170 200 
Total 510 600  510 600 
 
 
At this time, there is a $90 built-in gain in Redacre, which is 
reflected in the difference between the property’s $100 fair market 
value and its $10 basis. Because subchapter K treats distributions as 
nonrecognition events, the partnership would not recognize this $90 
gain when it transfers Redacre to C.48 The $90 built-in gain would be 
deferred, with C now recognizing this gain on a future sale of 
Redacre. To that end, C would take a $10 basis in Redacre, which 
equals the partnership’s pre-distribution basis in the property.49 The 
basis adjustment would thus preserve Redacre’s pre-distribution 
built-in gain. The only difference would be the incidence of tax, now 
falling on C rather than the partnership. If Redacre were sold for 
$100 after the distribution, C, not the partnership, would recognize a 
$90 gain. 
Nonrecognition similarly drives the tax consequences at the 
partner level. As previously discussed, the distributee partner does 
not recognize any of the built-in gain in her partnership interest at the 
time of distribution.50 This gain is instead deferred for future taxation 
through a combination of basis adjustments made to her partnership 
interest and the distributed property. Specifically, the partner takes a 
basis in the distributed property equal to the partnership’s pre-
distribution basis in the property and reduces her outside basis by a 
 
in the partnership is thus one-fifth ($100 fair market value of partnership interest / $500 fair 
market value of partnership). 
 48. I.R.C. § 731(b). 
 49. Id. § 732(a)(1). 
 50. See supra note 39. 
TAXING REALITY 10/7/2014 6:48 PM 
676 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:657 
corresponding amount.51 These basis adjustments are designed to 
ensure that the post-distribution built-in gain reflected in the 
distributed property and the distributee partner’s partnership interest, 
taken together, equal the pre-distribution built-in gain reflected in her 
partnership interest.52 
In the case of a complete liquidating distribution, subchapter K’s 
distribution provisions, particularly those governing basis 
adjustments, operate differently. They remain grounded in 
nonrecognition, but they must now reflect the fact that the distributee 
partner no longer has an interest in the partnership. As a result, all of 
the pre-distribution built-in gain reflected in the distributee partner’s 
partnership interest must now be reflected in the distributed property. 
The distributee partner thus takes a basis in the distributed property 
equal to her outside basis.53 Otherwise, a complete liquidating 
distribution is treated like any other distribution.54  
 To illustrate the consequences to the distributee partner, let’s 
return to the ABC partnership’s partially liquidating distribution to C. 
Immediately before this distribution, C held a partnership interest 
with a fair market value of $200 and an outside basis of $170; hence, 
there was a $30 built-in gain in her interest. The distribution would 
not trigger recognition of this gain.55 Taxation would instead be 
 
 51. I.R.C. §§ 732(a)(1), 733. 
 52. As discussed supra note 46, these basis adjustments do not always work perfectly; 
hence, challenges often arise. 
 53. I.R.C. § 732(b). The distributee partner thus often takes a basis in the distributed 
property that is different from the partnership’s pre-distribution basis in such property. As a 
result, subchapter K’s transferred basis provisions may again fail to preserve the pre-distribution 
built-in gain in the distributed property. For a discussion of the problems created by this basis 
imbalance, see infra note 121.  
 54. See supra note 33. From a capital account perspective, there is a sharp difference in the 
treatment of liquidating and non-liquidating distributions. If a partnership makes a distribution in 
complete or partial liquidation of a partnership interest, the partnership may elect to “rebook” its 
property. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f)(5)(ii). That is, the partnership may revalue all of its 
property, thereby recognizing any economic appreciation in the property. These “book” gains 
would then be allocated among the partners based on their pre-distribution sharing arrangement. 
Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f)(1), (2). A rebooking thus allows all of the partners to share in the 
economic gains of the partnership based on their pre-distribution sharing arrangement in 
anticipation of a change in such arrangement, effectively “locking in” each partner’s share of the 
partnership’s pre-distribution economic gains. Put another way, it reflects the fact that a 
liquidating distribution—whether complete or partial—has a transformative effect on the 
partnership. For a more detailed discussion of partnership rebookings, see generally MCKEE ET 
AL., supra note 10, ¶ 11.02[2][c][ii]; ARTHUR B. WILLIS & PHILIP F. POSTLEWAITE, 
PARTNERSHIP TAXATION ¶ 10.04[3][c] (7th ed. 2011) (2012). 
 55. I.R.C. § 731(a)(1). 
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deferred, with the $30 of appreciation preserved through C’s post-
distribution basis in Redacre and her partnership interest. As 
previously discussed, C would take a $10 basis in Redacre.56 She 
would thus decrease her outside basis by a corresponding amount, 
reducing it from $170 to $160.57 After the distribution, the 
partnership would have the following balance sheet: 
 
Assets Basis Value Capital Basis  Value 
      
Cash 500 500 A 170 200 
   B 170 200 
   C 160 100 
Total 500 500  500 500 
 
 
Taken together, C’s bases in Redacre and her post-distribution 
partnership interest would preserve the $30 built-in gain in her  
pre-distribution partnership interest. There would be a $90 built-in 
gain reflected in Redacre, and C would recognize this gain if she 
were to sell the property. Her partnership interest, in contrast, would 
be worth $100 with an outside basis of $160. If C were to sell her 
partnership interest, she would recognize a $60 loss. When these 
results are combined, C would have a net built-in gain of $30 in her 
post-distribution property, consistent with the pre-distribution built-
in gain in her partnership interest. 
More generally, subchapter K’s nonrecognition-based 
distribution system is designed to preserve the aggregate amount of 
pre-distribution built-in gain through the distributee partner’s post-
distribution bases in the distributed property and her partnership 
interest. This system, however, does not focus on the identity of the 
taxpayer or the rate of tax that will be applied to such built-in gains 
on a subsequent sale. Yet changes in the taxpayer or the tax rate raise 
equitable concerns. Indeed, as will be discussed below, it is equally 
 
 56. See supra note 49. 
 57. I.R.C. § 733. 
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important that distributions preserve the amount and character of 
each partner’s share of the partnership’s pre-distribution built-in 
gains.58 
These equitable concerns are best explored by returning to the 
aggregate theory of partnerships, where each partner is treated as 
owning her respective share of each item of partnership property.59 
As a direct owner of the partnership’s property, each partner would 
be entitled to the benefits and burdens associated with such property, 
including any built-in gain in the property. Because subchapter K 
treats a distribution as a nonrecognition event, the transaction should 
have no effect on the partners’ interest in any item of partnership 
property. In fact, equity would seem to require that these pre-
distribution built-in gains be preserved on a property-by-property 
basis. 
To illustrate, let’s return to the ABC partnership and its partial 
liquidating distribution to C. Recall that there was a $90 built-in gain 
in Redacre immediately before the distribution, and each partner’s 
share of this gain was $30.60 Under the aggregate theory of 
partnerships, each partner would thus be treated as if she directly 
owned a one-third interest in Redacre, with a fair market value of 
$33.33 and a basis of $3.33.61 Accordingly, there would be a $30 
built-in gain in each partner’s interest in Redacre. 
The partnership’s distribution of Redacre would alter these 
shares. C would now own Redacre in her individual capacity; thus 
she alone would bear the tax burden associated with Redacre. If C 
were to sell Redacre for its fair market value of $100, she would 
recognize a $90 gain. Put another way, the distribution would 
increase her share of Redacre’s built-in gain by $60, from $30 to 
$90. Likewise, the distribution would reduce A’s and B’s share of 
 
 58. See infra Part II.B. 
 59. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 60. Before the distribution, Redacre had a fair market value of $100 and a basis of $10. If the 
partnership had sold Redacre rather than distributing it to C, it would have recognized a $90 
capital gain. I.R.C. §§ 1001, 1221(a). This gain, in turn, would have been allocated equally 
among the partners: $30 each. Id. § 704(b). 
 61. The fair market value of Redacre was $100. If the property were divided into three equal 
interests, each interest would be worth $33.33 ($100 fair market value * 1/3). Likewise, the basis 
in each interest would equal one-third of the partnership’s basis in Redacre, or $3.33 ($10 basis * 
1/3). 
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this built-in gain by a corresponding amount.62 The distribution 
would allow A and B to dispose of their direct interests in Redacre in 
a tax-free manner, but it would fail to preserve their respective built-
in gains. Rather, the distribution would shift these built-in gains to 
C.63 
To summarize, subchapter K’s original distribution system 
focused on preserving the aggregate amount of built-in gains 
reflected in the distributed property and the distributee partner’s 
partnership interest. But this system was not sensitive to the identity 
of the taxpayer that would ultimately bear the corresponding federal 
tax liability. Although taxpayer identity raised equitable concerns, 
Congress did not believe that the related revenue stakes were 
particularly high.64 Subchapter K’s distribution system thus did not 
require that a distribution preserve the amount and character of each 
partner’s share of the partnership’s pre-distribution built-in gains. 
Subchapter K instead left the enforcement of these equitable 
concerns largely up to partnerships themselves.65 
B.  Use and Abuse of Partnership Distributions 
Congress quickly came to understand its error; the revenue 
stakes in subchapter K were in fact high, and partnerships could not 
be trusted to self-police. In the absence of equity-based provisions, 
partnerships used a variety of techniques to structure distributions 
 
 62. Immediately before the distribution, A’s and B’s respective shares of Redacre’s built-in 
gain were $30. After the distribution, the partnership no longer holds Redacre; hence, their shares 
of the property’s tax appreciation would be zero. 
 63. It is, however, important to note that this shift is temporary, reversing itself on each 
partner’s sale or liquidation of her partnership interest. Nonetheless, this type of income shifting, 
and the resulting deferral effect, remain problematic because the offsetting allocations may not 
occur for many years, if at all. The longer it takes to reverse the income shift, the more the 
deferral effect begins to look like a permanent exemption from the federal income tax. William D. 
Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 
1124 (1974). 
 64. See H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 65 (1954); S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 89 (1954); see also J. 
Paul Jackson et al., A Proposed Revision of the Federal Income Tax Treatment of Partnerships 
and Partners—American Law Institute Draft, 9 TAX L. REV. 109, 113 (1954) [hereinafter Jackson 
et al., 1954 American Law Institute Draft]; J. Paul Jackson et al., The Internal Revenue Code of 
1954: Partnerships, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 1183, 1183 (1954) [hereinafter Jackson et al., Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954]. 
 65. At the time of subchapter K’s codification, Congress was in fact concerned with 
transactions designed to convert ordinary income into preferentially treated capital gains. As will 
be discussed infra Part II.B.2, subchapter K’s original provisions did focus on preventing 
improper character conversions. I.R.C. §§ 731(a)(2), 735, 751(b) (1954). 
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that improperly reduced the partners’ aggregate tax burden in 
violation of equitable norms. This subpart uses the ABC partnership 
to explore three such abuses: income shifting, character conversions, 
and income avoidance.66 
1.  Income Shifting 
A distribution can be used to shift income among partners, 
improperly altering each partner’s share of pre-distribution built-in 
gain. To illustrate, let’s return to the previous example involving the 
ABC partnership. This time, however, let’s assume that the 
partnership holds inventory (“Inventory”) rather than Redacre, and 
the partnership distributes the Inventory to C in partial liquidation of 
her partnership interest.67 At the time of the distribution, the 
Inventory has a fair market value of $100 and a basis of $10. 
Neither C nor the partnership would recognize any gain on the 
distribution, and C would take a basis of $10 in the Inventory.68 In 
doing so, subchapter K’s distribution system would preserve the 
Inventory’s $90 aggregate built-in gain for future recognition; if C 
were to sell the property for its post-distribution fair market value of 
$100, she would recognize a $90 gain. 
Even so, this distribution would change the incidence of tax, 
shifting $60 of income from A and B, the non-distributee partners, to 
C, the distributee partner. Like the previous example, each partner’s 
share of the Inventory’s pre-distribution built-in gain was $30.69 Yet 
after the distribution, C would bear the tax burden for the entire $90 
of gain. The distribution would thus absolve A and B of 
responsibility for their respective $30 shares of the Inventory’s pre-
distribution built-in gain. Assuming that A and B are subject to a 
higher rate of tax than C, this income shift would produce a net tax 
 
 66. This subpart offers readers a simple introduction to the primary abuses involving 
partnership distributions. It is important to note that subchapter K does include a variety of anti-
abuse provisions designed to prevent many of these abuses, and these provisions will be 
discussed in greater detail infra Part II.C. For purposes of this subpart, however, I will assume 
that subchapter K does not include any anti-abuse provisions. My goal here is simply to illustrate 
the tax shelter opportunities created by a distribution system that is grounded in a nonrecognition 
rule. 
 67. As noted, this subpart disregards subchapter K’s current smorgasbord of anti-abuse 
provisions. Nonetheless, one such provision, section 751(b), would in fact apply to this 
transaction. Section 751(b) will be discussed in greater detail infra Part II.C.3. 
 68. See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text. 
 69. See supra note 60.  
TAXING REALITY 10/7/2014 6:48 PM 
2014] TAXING REALITY 681 
savings for the partners.70 More broadly, shifting income from high 
bracket partners to low bracket partners benefits the partnership as a 
whole by decreasing the aggregate tax liability associated with the 
future sale of the distributed property. But it does so at the expense 
of the public at large, depriving the federal government of tax 
revenues.71 
2.  Character Conversions 
A distribution can also be used to convert ordinary income into 
preferentially treated capital gains. This type of transaction was 
particularly popular during subchapter K’s early years when 
individual income tax rates were as high as 91 percent, yet the capital 
gains rate was only 25 percent.72 To the extent that subchapter K’s 
original provisions affirmatively focused on equity, it was to address 
this type of character converting distribution.73 
Returning again to the ABC partnership’s distribution of the 
Inventory, the transaction also involved an improper character 
conversion. If the partnership had sold the Inventory instead of 
distributing it to C, it would have recognized a $90 gain, and this 
gain would have been ordinary.74 Once C takes possession of the 
Inventory, however, the character of any gain recognized on a 
subsequent sale would be determined based on C’s use of the 
property. Assuming that C is not a dealer in Inventory, the property 
would likely qualify as a capital asset.75 Any sale of the Inventory by 
C for its then fair market value of $100 would thus result in a $90 
capital gain.76 
By converting a pre-distribution ordinary gain into a post-
distribution capital gain, the partnership would reduce the tax rate 
applicable to any gain recognized on the Inventory’s sale. Like 
income shifting, character conversions reduce the partners’ aggregate 
 
 70. For an example of the benefit achieved through income shifting, see supra note 25. 
 71. As discussed supra note 63, this income shift is temporary, reversing itself on a partner’s 
sale or liquidation of her partnership interest. 
 72. I.R.C. §§ 1(a) (providing tax rates for individuals), 1201(b) (providing capital gains rate 
for individuals) (1954).  
 73. See infra note 80. 
 74. I.R.C. §§ 702(b), 1221(a)(1) (2006). 
 75. I.R.C. § 1221(a). 
 76. Subchapter K does in fact contain a series of anti-abuse provisions designed to prevent 
this type of character conversion. Id. §§ 735(a), 751(b). For a discussion of these provisions, see 
infra note 80 (section 735) and Part II.C.3 (section 751(b)).  
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tax liability. Indeed, distributions often involve both of these abuses, 
converting the character of a built-in gain and shifting it among the 
partners. In these instances, subchapter K’s distribution system fails 
to preserve both the amount and the character of the partners’ 
respective shares of the partnership’s pre-distribution built-in gain. 
3.  Income Avoidance 
The final distribution-related abuse involves distributions that 
are part of a coordinated plan to disguise taxable property 
dispositions. In these transactions, a partner’s contribution of 
property to the partnership is followed by a distribution of property 
to the same partner. Although the contribution and distribution, taken 
together, would otherwise effect a property disposition, subchapter K 
treats both transactions as nonrecognition events, thereby deferring 
the recognition of any built-in gain.77 By using the partnership as a 
conduit, the partner is able to achieve a result often impossible 
outside of subchapter K—a tax-free property disposition. 
Returning to the ABC partnership, imagine that B owns 
additional inventory in her individual capacity, and she wishes to sell 
this property to the partnership. The additional inventory is worth 
$200 and has a basis of $150, and B wants to avoid recognizing the 
property’s $50 built-in gain on the disposition. Accordingly, B and 
the partnership “disguise” this disposition as follows: B would first 
contribute the additional inventory to the partnership, and the 
partnership would subsequently distribute $200 of cash to B.78 
Because both transactions are treated as nonrecognition events, 
neither the contribution nor the distribution would trigger recognition 
of the $50 built-in gain attributable to the additional inventory.79 This 
 
 77. Contributions to a partnership, like distributions from a partnership, are treated as 
nonrecognition transactions under subchapter K. I.R.C. § 721(a). Neither the contributing partner 
nor the partnership recognizes gain on the contribution of property to a partnership in exchange 
for a partnership interest. Id. Any built-in gain in the contributed property is instead deferred for 
future recognition on a subsequent sale of either the contributed property or the contributing 
partner’s partnership interest. The preservation of this built-in gain is achieved through basis 
adjustments at both the partner and the partnership level. Id. §§ 722 (contributing partner’s 
outside basis), 723 (partnership’s basis in contributed property). 
 78. Like the aforementioned anti-abuse provisions addressing income and character 
converting transactions, subchapter K also contains provisions that attempt to prevent this type of 
disguised sale. Id. §§ 707(a)(2)(B), 737. For a discussion of these provisions, see infra notes 82 
(section 707(a)(2)(B)) and 85 (section 737). 
 79. If B were to contribute the additional inventory to the partnership, neither she nor the 
partnership would recognize any gain on the transaction. I.R.C. § 721(a). Instead, the $50 built-in 
TAXING REALITY 10/7/2014 6:48 PM 
2014] TAXING REALITY 683 
coordinated transaction would thus allow B to avoid recognizing gain 
on what is, in substance, a taxable property disposition. 
C.  Government Responses 
Nonrecognition in partnership distributions proved problematic 
from the outset, allowing partnerships to manipulate deferred built-in 
gains to their partners’ advantage. When subchapter K was codified, 
Congress considered character conversions to be its most pressing 
concern and responded accordingly.80 Over time, however, the 
difference between the capital gains rate and the highest individual 
income tax rate shrank; hence, the danger associated with character 
conversions diminished. At the same time, Congress came to 
appreciate the tremendous public cost associated with income 
shifting and avoidance.81 
Throughout this period, Congress responded aggressively to 
abusive distributions, enacting various anti-abuse provisions. A 
 
gain would be preserved through a series of basis adjustments. Id. §§ 722, 723. To that end, B 
would increase her outside basis by $150, from $170 to $320. Id. § 722. Likewise, the partnership 
would take a basis of $150 in the additional inventory. Id. § 723. When the partnership then 
distributes $200 in cash to B, the transaction would again be treated as a tax-free event: neither B 
nor the partnership would recognize a gain. Id. § 731(a)(1), (b). B would adjust her outside basis 
accordingly, reducing it from $320 to $120. Id. § 733. 
 80. See, e.g., Jackson et al., 1954 American Law Institute Draft, supra note 64, at 154. 
Examples of subchapter K’s original character conversion-focused provisions include sections 
731(a)(1), 735, and 751(b). I.R.C. §§ 731(a)(2), 735(a), 751(b) (1954). The section 751(b) 
disproportionate distribution rule will be discussed in greater detail infra Part II.C.3. Section 735 
deals with a distributee partner’s sale of property received in a distribution. If a partnership 
distributes certain types of property to a partner that would generate ordinary income if sold by 
the partnership, then the distributee partner’s subsequent sale of such property will also generate 
ordinary income. I.R.C. § 735(a) (2006). The duration of this “taint” depends on the particular 
type of “ordinary” asset distributed. Id. § 735(a)(1) (indefinite taint for assets treated as 
“unrealized receivables,” as defined in section 751(c)), (a)(2) (five-year taint for assets treated as 
“inventory,” as defined in section 751(d)). For a more detailed discussion of section 735, see 
generally MCKEE ET AL., supra note 10, ¶ 20.02; WILLIS & POSTLEWAITE, supra note 54, ¶ 
13.04.  
  Section 731(a)(2), in contrast, addresses the alternate side of character conversions, 
preventing the conversion of a capital loss into a preferentially treated ordinary loss through a 
complete liquidating distribution. I.R.C. § 731(a)(2). It applies to complete liquidating 
distributions where the distributee partner receives a combination of cash and property that, if 
sold by the partnership, would generate ordinary income. Id. In these instances, section 731(a)(2) 
requires the distributee partner to recognize a loss equal to the excess of (1) the distributee 
partner’s pre-distribution outside basis over (2) the sum of the basis that she takes in the 
distributed property and the amount of any cash received in the distribution. Id. For a more 
detailed discussion of section 731(a)(2), see generally MCKEE ET AL., supra note 10, ¶ 19.05; 
WILLIS & POSTLEWAITE, supra note 54, ¶ 13.02[2][c]. 
 81. See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., MEMORANDUM NO. 3, supra note 11, at 30–31; Andrews, 
supra note 7, at 4. 
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complex patchwork of provisions emerged to combat these sheltering 
transactions. Although diverse in operation, these anti-abuse 
provisions share two common characteristics: their design and their 
rejection of nonrecognition. After discussing these elements, this 
subpart will provide an example of subchapter K’s anti-abuse 
provisions in operation, using the section 751(b) disproportionate 
distribution rule as a guide through the maze of partnership 
distributions. 
1.  Design 
In large part, Congress’s desire to reconcile flexibility and 
equity in partnership distributions was the driving force behind the 
design of these anti-abuse provisions. The goal was to develop 
provisions that targeted specific abuses without infringing on 
legitimate partnership distributions. The result was narrowly tailored, 
intricate provisions designed to pinpoint particular tax shelters 
through a combination of mathematical rules and open-textured 
standards.82 Put another way, these anti-abuse provisions were 
terribly complicated. 
At the same time, these provisions were often reactive, 
combating the last tax shelter rather than the next tax shelter. 
Congress perpetually found itself behind the tax shelter market, 
drafting an ad hoc series of targeted responses instead of developing 
a comprehensive, forward-thinking approach to abusive 
 
 82. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 707(a)(2)(B), 751(b). Section 751(b) will be discussed infra Part 
II.C.3. The section 707(a)(2)(B) disguised sale rule provides that a contribution and distribution 
will be recast as a taxable disposition between the partner and the partnership if, when considered 
together, the two transactions are more properly characterized as a sale. I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(B). 
The determination of whether a contribution and distribution are, in substance, a sale is made by 
using a standards-based approach. Treas. Reg. § 1.707-3(b)(2). A partnership is required to 
consider all relevant facts and circumstances in making this determination, but the regulation 
provides a list of ten factors that may lead to the conclusion that a coordinated contribution and 
distribution are, in fact, a sale. Id. Of particular importance, these factors focus on whether the 
partner’s receipt of the distribution was subject to the entrepreneurial risks of the partnership’s 
operations. Id. In order to ease the burden of this standard, the regulation also includes two 
rebuttable presumptions: (1) a contribution and distribution occurring within a two-year period 
are presumed to be a disguised sale; and (2) a contribution and distribution occurring more than 
two years apart are presumed to be independent transactions. Id. § 1.707–3(c)(1), (d). For a more 
detailed discussion of the section 707(a)(2)(B) disguised sale rule, see generally MCKEE ET AL., 
supra note 10, ¶ 14.02[3][B]; WILLIS & POSTLEWAITE, supra note 54, ¶ 13.02[7]. 
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distributions.83 As a result, these anti-abuse provisions lack systemic 
coherence and offer too little guidance for law-abiding partnerships. 
2.  Erosion of Nonrecognition 
Operationally, the last half-century of anti-abuse provisions have 
largely relied on recognition rules that require the distributee partner 
or the partnership to recognize gain at the time of distribution. By 
cutting off deferral at distribution, these anti-abuse provisions 
eliminate the built-in gains necessary to shift income, convert 
character, or avoid gain recognition. Although their approaches to 
recognition vary, all of these anti-abuse provisions strive to recast the 
underlying transaction in a manner that better reflects its commercial 
substance. Some provisions, such as the section 751(b) 
disproportionate distribution rule and the section 707(a)(2)(B) 
disguised sale rule, treat the distribution as a taxable sale or exchange 
between the partnership and the distributee partner.84 In these 
transactions, the recharacterized distribution may trigger gain 
recognition by both the partnership and the distributee partner. Other 
provisions adopt a narrower approach, only requiring the distributee 
partner to recognize gain.85 In these instances, the recognized gain is 
 
 83. In 1994, IRS Deputy Associate Chief Counsel Monte Jackel described this problem in 
the following manner: “We’re talking about the world of today. There’s been too many 
transactions that are too close to the line—results and opinions about the interaction of rules 
which we believe are inappropriate . . . . We need help in crafting a rule to police the partnership 
area. We have decided as an institution that we are not going to pursue these problems on a  
case-by-case basis anymore.” Lee A. Sheppard, Partnership Antiabuse Rule: Dirty Minds Meet 
Mrs. Gregory, 64 TAX NOTES 295, 295 (1994). 
 84. For a discussion of the section 751(b) disproportionate distribution rule, see infra Part 
II.C.3. Likewise, for a discussion of the section 707(a)(2)(B) disguised sale rule, see supra note 
82. 
 85. I.R.C. §§ 704(c)(1)(B), 737. Section 704(c)(1)(B) was designed to curtail transactions 
where the partnership is used as a “mixing bowl” to shift a built-in gain attributable to contributed 
property from the contributing partner to another partner. To that end, if a partner contributes 
property to a partnership and, within the seven-year period following the contribution, the 
contributed property is distributed to another partner, section 704(c)(1)(B) requires the 
contributing partner to recognize the pre-contribution gain. Id. § 704(c)(1)(B)(i). For a detailed 
discussion of the section 704(c)(1)(B) mixing bowl rule, see generally MCKEE ET AL., supra note 
10, ¶ 11.04[4]; WILLIS & POSTLEWAITE ET AL., supra note 54, ¶ 13.02[6][b]. 
In contrast, the section 737 mixing bowl rule operates as a backstop to the section 
707(a)(2)(B) disguised sale rule, which is discussed supra note 82. It applies to a partner that 
contributes property to a partnership and receives a distribution of different property during the 
succeeding seven-year period. I.R.C. § 737(a). If applicable, section 737 requires a partner to 
recognize a gain that is intended to approximate the gain that she would have recognized on a 
taxable disposition of the property previously contributed to the partnership. For a detailed 
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typically computed by reference to a hypothetical sale of partnership 
property at its fair market value immediately before the 
distribution.86 To the extent that the partnership would have allocated 
any hypothetical gain to the distributee partner, these anti-abuse 
provisions require her to recognize such gain at the time of 
distribution.87 
3.  An Example: Section 751(b) 
Section 751(b) is the oldest and most troublesome of Congress’s 
recognition-based anti-abuse provisions, recasting “disproportionate” 
distributions as taxable exchanges between the partnership and the 
distributee partner. Congress originally designed section 751(b) to 
combat character conversions, but over time it has become a bulwark 
against a diverse array of abuses, including income shifting and 
excessive deferral.88 Despite its expanded role in fighting abusive 
distributions, section 751(b) exists in virtually its original form.89 It 
 
discussion of the section 737 mixing bowl rule, see generally MCKEE ET AL., supra note 10, ¶ 
19.08; WILLIS & POSTLEWAITE, supra note 54, ¶ 13.02[1][a][v]. 
 86. I.R.C. §§ 704(c)(1)(B)(i), 737(b). 
 87. Id.; see also § 731(c) (treating marketable securities as money for purposes of 
determining the tax consequences to a distributee partner). 
 88. H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 71 (1954); S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 98–99 (1954); H.R. REP. 
NO. 83-2543, at 64–65 (1954) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5280, 5325–26; see 
also, e.g., AM. LAW INST., SUBCHAPTER K PROJECT, supra note 11, at 49; Andrews, supra note 
7, at 4 (“The original purpose for this provision had primarily to do with the distinction between 
capital gain and ordinary income rates, more than timing of gain recognition, but it currently 
functions to set an important, though inadequate limit on unreasonable postponement of tax.”). 
Alongside distribution-related character concerns, section 751(b) originally reflected parallel 
concerns regarding the treatment of sales of partnership interests. From an economic perspective, 
a complete liquidating distribution of cash to a retiring partner is the equivalent of a sale of the 
retiring partner’s interest. The only difference is the identity of the purchaser—the remaining 
partners, in the case of a complete liquidating distribution, versus a third party, in the case of a 
sale. When subchapter K was originally codified, it contained a series of provisions designed to 
prevent character conversions through sales of partnership interests. I.R.C. §§ 741, 751(a) (1954). 
In order to prevent partnerships from avoiding these “collapsible partnership” provisions through 
the use of distributions, Subchapter K’s original distribution system required comparable 
provisions. Section 751(b), it was hoped, would perform that function. See, e.g., Paul Little, 
Partnership Distributions Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (First Installment), 10 TAX 
LAW REV. 161, 182–83 (1954). For an excellent history of section 751(b), see generally MCKEE 
ET AL., supra note 10, ¶ 21.02[2]; Burke, supra note 11, at 680–93; Hanna, supra note 11, at 469–
85. 
 89. I.R.C. § 751(b) (1954); Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(b) (1956). In 2006, the Treasury requested 
comments regarding the possible revision of section 751(b). I.R.S. Notice 2006-14, 2006-1 C.B. 
498. In explaining the rationale behind its review of section 751(b), it noted that “the current 
regulations under Section 751(b) were published in 1956 and have not been amended to reflect 
significant changes in subchapter K and in the operations of contemporary partnerships.” Id. at 
499. Eight years later, the Treasury has yet to issue proposed regulations under section 751(b). 
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thus reflects an erstwhile era of partnership distributions, failing to 
account for the seismic shifts in modern partnerships and partnership 
tax shelters. 
Section 751(b) first requires a partnership to divide its assets 
into two categories—“hot assets” and “cold assets.” Broadly 
speaking, hot assets are assets that would generate ordinary income if 
sold by the partnership, such as inventory and accounts receivable; 
everything else is a cold asset.90 To illustrate this division, let’s 
return to the ABC partnership. Let’s also assume that the partnership 
has three assets: $200 in cash, investment property (“Blueacre”) with 
a fair market value and basis of $300, and Inventory with a fair 
market value of $100 and a basis of $10. The Inventory is treated as 
a hot asset under section 751(b) because its sale by the partnership 
would result in ordinary income.91 The cash and Blueacre, in 
contrast, are cold assets.  
Once the partnership has properly divided its assets, it must 
determine if a particular distribution is “disproportionate,” thus 
triggering section 751(b)’s recognition rule. A distribution is 
disproportionate if the distributee partner receives more than her 
share of the partnership’s hot assets or cold assets, in each case, as 
measured by their gross asset value.92 If disproportionate, section 
751(b) recasts the distribution as a taxable exchange between the 
distributee partner and the partnership.93 
Consider again the ABC partnership. Assume that C wishes to 
retire from the partnership; hence, the partnership transfers $200 in 
 
 90. I.R.C. § 751(b). Hot assets include two categories of assets—unrealized receivables and 
substantially appreciated inventory. Id. Unrealized receivables are any rights, not previously 
included in income under the taxpayer’s method of accounting, to payment for services rendered 
or payment for goods delivered to the extent that such payment would not be treated as an amount 
received from the disposition of a capital asset. Id. § 751(c). Inventory, in contrast, is defined 
broadly to include (1) property that would be included in a taxpayer’s inventory if on hand at the 
close of the taxable year; (2) any other property of the partnership that, if disposed of, would not 
be considered a capital asset or section 1231 property; and (3) any other property of the 
partnership that, if held by the distributee partner, would fall within this definition of “inventory.” 
Id. § 751(d). Inventory, in turn, is substantially appreciated if its aggregate fair market value 
exceeds 120 percent of its aggregate basis to the partnership. Id. § 751(b)(3)(A). 
 91. I.R.C. § 751(d)(1). The Inventory falls within the statutory definition of “inventory” 
because it would be included in inventory if the partnership held it at the end of the taxable year. 
Id. Additionally, the Inventory is treated as substantially appreciated inventory. Id. 
§ 751(b)(3)(A). Its fair market value ($120) exceeds 120 percent of its basis ($10). 
 92. Id. § 751(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(g), exs. 2, 3. 
 93. I.R.C. § 751(b). 
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cash to her in a complete liquidating distribution.94 This distribution 
would be disproportionate because C receives only cold assets—
cash—in complete liquidation of her partnership interest. Put another 
way, C’s interest in the partnership’s hot assets, as determined by 
their gross asset value, would decrease from $33.33 to $0.95 Section 
751(b) would therefore recharacterize the distribution as an exchange 
between C and the partnership, with C exchanging her one-third 
share of the Inventory for a larger share of the partnership’s cash.96 
To implement this exchange, section 751(b) breaks a 
distribution into three fictional transactions. Because the 
disproportionate distribution is recast as an exchange between the 
distributee partner and the partnership, the distributee partner first 
needs to obtain the property that she will be deemed to exchange for 
a portion of the property actually distributed to her. In the first 
imaginary transaction, the partnership thus distributes this property—
the property that she relinquishes in the actual distribution—to the 
distributee partner.97 In the previous example, section 751(b) would 
treat C as if she received a distribution of one-third of the 
 
 94. Immediately before this distribution, the partnership had the following balance sheet: 
 
Assets Basis Value Capital Basis  Value 
      
Cash 200 200 A 170 200 
Inventory 10 100 B 170 200 
Blueacre 300 300 C 170 200 
Total 510 600  510 600 
 
 95.  Id. § 751(b)(1)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(g), ex. 2. Immediately before the distribution, 
the partnership held Inventory with a fair market value of $100 and a basis of $10. As a one-third 
partner, C would be treated as having a one-third interest in the Inventory, with a fair market 
value of $33.33 ($100 fair market value * 1/3 interest) and a basis of $3.33 ($10 basis * 1/3). 
 96. More generally, when a distribution reduces a partner’s share of the partnership’s hot 
assets, section 751(b) treats the partner as if she exchanged all or a portion of her share of the 
partnership’s hot assets for a larger share of the partnership’s cold assets. I.R.C. § 751(b)(1)(B). 
Conversely, when a distribution increases a partner’s share of the partnership’s hot assets, section 
751(b) treats the partner as if she exchanged all or a portion of her share of the partnership’s cold 
assets for a larger share of the partnership’s hot assets. Id. § 751(b)(1)(A). 
In this transaction, C is also exchanging her one-third share of Blueacre for an increased 
share of the partnership’s cash. This type of cold asset exchange is beyond section 751(b)’s scope 
because it does not involve an “exchange” of assets of differing character. It can, however, 
present income shifting concerns. 
 97. Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(b)(3)(iii), (g), ex. 2(d)(1). 
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partnership’s Inventory, with a fair market value of $33.33 and a 
basis of $3.33.98 Neither C nor the partnership would recognize a 
gain on this first-step distribution.99 C would instead take a basis of 
$3.33 in the Inventory and would adjust her outside basis 
accordingly, reducing it from $170 to $166.67.100 
 The second fictional transaction is the exchange, where the 
distributee partner exchanges the property received in the first-step 
distribution for a portion of the property involved in the actual 
distribution.101 Returning to the ABC partnership, C would thus 
transfer the Inventory back to the partnership and, in exchange, she 
would receive $33.33 in cash from the partnership.102 C would 
recognize a $30 ordinary gain on this exchange.103 In contrast, the 
partnership would recognize no gain, treating the transaction as a 
cash purchase of the Inventory. It would, however, take a basis of 
$33.33 in this “newly acquired” Inventory, thus increasing its 
aggregate basis in the Inventory from $6.67 to $40.104 
 
 98. See supra note 95. 
 99. I.R.C. § 731(a)(1), (b). 
 100. Id. §§ 732(a)(1), 733. Immediately after this first imaginary transaction, the partnership 
would have the following balance sheet: 
 
Assets Basis Value Capital Basis  Value 
      
Cash 200 200 A 170 200 
Inventory 6.67 66.67 B 170 200 
Blueacre 300 300 C 166.67 166.67 
Total 506.67 566.67  506.67 566.67 
 
At the partnership level, the balance sheet would also reflect the Inventory distributed to C in this 
first-step fictional transaction. Recall that the partnership held Inventory with a fair market value 
of $100 and a basis of $10 before the distribution. After the distribution, the partnership holds 
Inventory with a fair market value of $66.67 ($100 pre-distribution fair market value of Inventory 
less $33.33 fair market value of Inventory distributed) and a basis of $6.67 ($10 pre-distribution 
basis of Inventory less $3.33 basis of Inventory distributed). Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(g), ex. 2(e)(2). 
 101. Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(b)(3)(i), (g), ex. 2(c). 
 102. That is, C would be treated as if she sold Inventory with a fair market value of $33.33 
and a basis of $3.33 to the partnership for cash. The partnership, in contrast, would be treated as if 
it purchased Inventory for $33.33 in cash. 
 103. I.R.C. § 1001; Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(b)(3)(iii), (g), ex. 2(d)(1). The $30 of gain 
recognized by C reflects the difference between the Inventory’s purchase price ($33.33) and C’s 
basis in the Inventory ($3.33). 
 104. I.R.C. § 1012; Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(g), ex. (e)(1). The partnership had a basis of $6.67 
in the portion of the Inventory that was not distributed to C in the first-step distribution. When 
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The third imaginary transaction represents the proportionate 
element of the actual transaction, with the partnership making a 
distribution of the remainder of the property actually distributed to 
the partner.105 Returning to the ABC partnership, this final 
transaction would involve a $166.67 cash distribution to C. She has 
already received $33.33 in cash from the partnership; hence, an 
additional $166.67 is necessary to complete the actual $200 cash 
distribution. Neither C nor the partnership would recognize a gain on 
this distribution, and C’s outside basis would be reduced to zero.106 
As this example illustrates, section 751(b) is unbelievably 
complicated. It involves a total of seven steps, three fictional 
transactions, and the artificial division of the partnership’s assets into 
 
this basis is added to the $33.33 cost basis taken in the “exchanged” Inventory, the partnership 
would have a total basis of $40 in the Inventory. Immediately after the distribution, the 
partnership would have the following balance sheet: 
 
Assets Basis Value Capital Basis  Value 
      
Cash 166.67 166.67 A 170 200 
Inventory 40 100 B 170 200 
Blueacre 300 300 C 166.67 166.67 
Total 506.67 566.67  506.67 566.67 
 
This fictional exchange has no effect on C’s partnership interest, only involving her interest in the 
Inventory distributed in the first-step transaction. Accordingly, the fair market value and basis of 
C’s partnership interest would remain unchanged. 
 105. Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(g), ex. 2(d)(2). 
 106. I.R.C. §§ 731(a)–(b), 733; Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(g), ex. 2(d)(2), (e)(2). Immediately after 
this final step, the partnership would have the following balance sheet: 
 
Assets Basis Value Capital Basis  Value 
      
Inventory 40 100 A 170 200 
Blueacre 300 300 B 170 200 
Total 340 400  340 400 
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hot and cold categories.107 And this example—a complete liquidating 
distribution—is the easy case.108 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that, in this example, section 
751(b) would correctly preserve the amount and character of each 
partner’s share of the partnership’s pre-distribution built-in gains. 
And it would do so by recasting the distribution as a taxable 
exchange between the partnership and the distributee partner. Before 
the distribution, each partner’s share of the Inventory’s  
pre-distribution built-in gain was $30, and this gain was ordinary.109 
Section 751(b) would force C to recognize her share of this pre-
distribution ordinary gain, thereby preventing the distribution from 
shifting the built-in gain or converting its character.110 In contrast, 
A’s and B’s shares of the Inventory’s pre-distribution built-in gain 
would be preserved for future recognition. A and B would now be 
equal partners in a partnership holding Inventory with a fair market 
value of $100 and a basis of $40. A subsequent disposition of the 
Inventory would thus generate a $60 ordinary gain, which the 
partnership would allocate equally between A and B, $30 each. 
Even so, section 751(b) is not a panacea. It does not always 
succeed in preserving the amount and character of the partners’ 
shares of pre-distribution built-in gains. In fact, section 751(b), like 
 
 107. See supra note 10. 
 108. In both theory and practice, partial liquidating distributions are the most challenging type 
of distributions. See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., MEMORANDUM NO. 3, supra note 11, at 55–58; 
Andrews, supra note 7, at 57; Burke, supra note 11, at 710–17. 
 109. Before the distribution, the Inventory had a fair market value of $100 and a basis of $10. 
If the partnership had sold the Inventory rather than distributing it to C, it would have recognized 
a $90 ordinary gain on the sale. I.R.C. §§ 1001, 1221(a). This gain, in turn, would have been 
allocated equally among the partners, $30 each. Id. § 704(b). 
 110. Consider the tax consequences of this distribution if section 751(b) did not apply. The 
partnership would distribute $200 in cash to C in complete liquidation of her partnership interest. 
C would recognize a gain of $30 on the distribution because the amount of cash distributed 
($200) is greater than her outside basis ($170). Id. § 731(a)(1). This gain, however, would be 
treated as a capital gain. Id. § 731(a). Accordingly, the distribution would effect a character 
conversion, transforming ordinary income into a capital gain. Likewise, the distribution would 
increase A’s and B’s respective shares of the Inventory’s built-in gain. Before and after the 
distribution, there would be a $90 built-in gain reflected in the Inventory ($100 fair market value 
less $10 basis). If the partnership had sold the Inventory for its fair market value prior to the 
distribution, the three partners would have shared the resulting $90 gain equally, $30 each. After 
the distribution, C would no longer be a partner; therefore, A and B would share the resulting $90 
gain equally, $45 each. The distribution would thus increase A’s and B’s respective shares of the 
Inventory’s built-in gain by $15. 
In addition to section 751(b), subchapter K has another, elective mechanism designed to 
address this problem of “lost” basis and the resulting increase in the remaining partners’ shares of 
pre-distribution built-in gain. For a detailed discussion of this mechanism, see infra note 121. 
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many of subchapter K’s anti-abuse provisions, often works quite 
poorly. The next subpart addresses this problem and its impact on 
partnership distributions. 
D.  Partnership Distributions Today 
Partnership distributions today are flawed in both theory and 
practice. The problem with partnership distributions is first 
principles—the tax treatment of distributions, especially liquidating 
distributions, does not reflect the commercial reality of these 
transactions. Congress and the Treasury have thus spent the last  
half-century trying to manage this disconnect, attempting to combat 
the resulting tax shelters while preserving subchapter K’s flexibility. 
Yet these efforts have largely failed: the law of partnership 
distributions is now complicated, inequitable, and unstable. Partner 
compliance, in turn, is declining at both extremes of the partnership 
spectrum, with well-intentioned partnerships struggling to 
understand subchapter K and sheltering partnerships finding 
opportunity in its dysfunctionality. 
1.  The Commercial Reality Gap 
There is a deep divide between subchapter K’s treatment of 
partnership distributions and their commercial reality. As previously 
discussed, partnerships make distributions for myriad reasons, and 
their effects on a partnership and the relationship among its partners 
vary accordingly.111 On one hand, operating distributions have very 
little impact on a partnership. The partners receive a proportionate 
share of the partnership’s previously taxed income; hence, their 
respective interests in the partnership remain unchanged. On another 
hand, liquidating distributions are economically transformative 
events, where a partner terminates all or a portion of her investment 
in the partnership. 
Yet all distributions are treated the same for tax purposes, 
subject to a singular nonrecognition-based set of tax provisions. In 
doing so, subchapter K elevates form over substance, focusing on the 
formal trait shared by these distributions—the transfer of cash or 
property from partnership to partner—instead of the commercial 
substance of these economically diverse transactions. Under this 
 
 111. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text. 
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uniform approach, form thus masks the foundational divide between 
operating distributions and liquidating distributions. By 
presumptively treating all distributions as nonrecognition 
transactions, subchapter K mistreats those distributions that are 
economically significant, namely, complete and partial liquidating 
distributions. 
Simply put, grounding the tax treatment of liquidating 
distributions in a nonrecognition rule is inconsistent with the 
commercial reality of these transactions. As a general matter, 
nonrecognition is appropriate when a taxpayer’s investment in an 
enterprise is continuing.112 The classic example is a like-kind 
exchange.113 If a taxpayer were to exchange a real estate investment 
in Wisconsin for a similar real estate investment in Pennsylvania, 
nonrecognition would likely be proper because the taxpayer’s 
investment is continuing, albeit in a slightly modified form. The 
taxpayer would not be taxed on any built-in gain in the Wisconsin 
property; instead, the gain would be deferred for future recognition 
on her sale of the Pennsylvania property.114 If, however, the taxpayer 
sold her real estate investment in Wisconsin for cash or exchanged it 
for an entirely different kind of property, like a helicopter, 
nonrecognition would no longer be appropriate. Here, the taxpayer 
would be terminating her real estate investment and should therefore 
recognize any built-in gain in the Wisconsin property, consistent 
with fundamental tax principals.115 
Similarly, liquidating distributions involve the termination of a 
partner’s investment in a partnership. In these transactions, the 
distributee partner receives cash or property from the partnership 
and, in exchange, relinquishes all or a portion of her interest in the 
partnership and its property.116 The liquidating distribution thus 
 
 112. See generally BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF 
INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 44.1 (3d ed. 1999 & Supp. III 2004); Karen C. Burke, Disguised 
Sales Between Partners and Partnerships: Section 707 and the Forthcoming Regulations, 63 IND. 
L.J. 489, 522–29 (1988); David R. Keyser, A Theory of Nonrecognition Under an Income Tax: 
The Case of Partnership Formation, 5 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 269, 279–85 (1986). 
 113. I.R.C. § 1031(a). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. § 1001. 
 116. This is true whether one thinks of the partnership as an aggregate of its partners or an 
entity separate and distinct from them. Under the aggregate view of partnerships, the distributee 
partner would be treated as if she relinquished her direct interest in each individual item of 
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fundamentally alters the nature of the partnership, closing a chapter 
for the historic partnership and opening a new chapter for the 
reconstituted partnership. From this vantage, the current law’s 
nonrecognition rule fails to capture the substantive impact of 
liquidating distributions, treating them as continuations, rather than 
terminations, of a partner’s investment in a partnership. 
Of equal importance, property distributions mark the termination 
of the partnership’s investment in the distributed property. If one 
thinks of the partnership as an entity separate from its partners, then 
the partnership itself is relinquishing its investment in property 
through the distribution. Likewise, if one disregards the partnership 
and thinks of the partners as direct co-owners of its property, then 
each partner would be treated as terminating her investment in her 
respective share of the distributed property.117 Considered in this 
light, nonrecognition is again inappropriate, mischaracterizing the 
substance of the distribution transaction.118 
2.  The Ripple Effect 
These theoretical gaps in the treatment of distributions have 
created practical challenges for subchapter K. Like all of the federal 
income tax, subchapter K is grounded in the notion that the tax 
consequences of a transaction should match the corresponding 
economic consequences.119 When the tax treatment of a transaction 
deviates from this equitable notion, partnerships often behave 
opportunistically in pursuit of an improper tax advantage. The 
 
partnership property in the distribution. Under the entity view of partnerships, in contrast, the 
distributee partner would be treated as if she relinquished her interest in the partnership itself. 
 117. In this instance, however, the aggregate theory of partnerships raises a complication. If 
each partner were treated as if she directly owned her proportionate interest in each item of 
partnership property, then the distributee partner would already own a portion of the property that 
she receives in the liquidating distribution. To the extent of this portion of the distributed 
property, the liquidating distribution arguably has no effect, simply transferring property to the 
distributee partner that she already owns. Put another way, the distributee partner’s investment is 
continuing, not terminating with respect to this portion of the distributed property. One might 
argue that nonrecognition is thus appropriate, at least for this portion of the larger transaction. 
This issue will be discussed infra note 157. 
 118. Indeed, the economic treatment of liquidating distributions, as evidenced by the partners’ 
capital accounts, reflects the transformative effect of these transactions. As previously discussed, 
a distribution is treated as a recognition event for capital account purposes. See supra notes 41 
and 45. Of equal importance, the partnership may elect to rebook all of its assets in connection 
with a distribution in partial or complete liquidation of a partner’s partnership interest. See supra 
note 54. 
 119. See supra notes 21–27 and accompanying text. 
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government, in turn, is forced to respond with technical anti-abuse 
provisions. The result is discord in one of subchapter K’s most 
ubiquitous transactions. 
a.  Complexity 
The complexity of partnership distributions was perhaps 
inevitable, when considered in light of Congress’s dual commitment 
to flexibility and equity. Reconciling these goals required a 
distinctive rulemaking design: one that was targeted, technical, and 
terribly intricate.120 And this model is evident in the anti-abuse 
provisions that Congress layered into subchapter K’s distribution 
system.121 
Notwithstanding their shared design, these anti-abuse provisions 
are not homogenous. On the contrary, all of these provisions are 
independently complicated, and their complexities are distinctive. 
Congress individualized each provision in order to target a particular 
 
 120. See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text. 
 121. It is also evident in the elective provisions that overlay partnership distributions. As 
previously discussed, partnerships are permitted to rebook all of their assets for capital account 
purposes in connection with partial and complete liquidating distributions. See supra note 54. 
Additionally, subchapter K contains elective provisions designed to address basis mismatches 
created by partnership distributions. I.R.C. §§ 734(b), 754 (2006). These basis mismatches arise 
in two circumstances: (1) when the distributee partner recognizes a gain or a loss on a 
distribution; and (2) when the distributee partner takes a basis in the distributed property that 
differs from the partnership’s pre-distribution basis in the property. In these instances, the 
partnership’s basis in its remaining property, which is not ordinarily adjusted to reflect a 
distribution, no longer reflects the remaining partners’ shares of pre-distribution built-in gain. Id. 
§ 734(a). As a result, these partners will recognize too much or too little gain on the partnership’s 
subsequent sale of its property. To ameliorate this problem, Congress permits partnerships to 
elect to adjust the basis of their remaining property following distributions that trigger these 
inequitable basis mismatches. Id. § 734(b). A partnership is permitted to increase the basis of its 
remaining assets if a partner recognizes a gain on a distribution or takes basis in the distributed 
property that is less than the partnership’s pre-distribution basis in the property. Id. § 734(b)(1). 
Likewise, if a partner recognizes a loss on a distribution or takes a basis in the distributed 
property that is greater than the partnership’s basis in the property, the partnership is permitted to 
decrease the basis of its remaining assets accordingly. Id. § 734(b)(2). Additionally, Congress 
mandates this type of negative basis adjustment when the distribution involves a substantial basis 
reduction. Id. § 734(b). If a distributee partner recognizes a loss in excess of $250,000 or the basis 
she takes in the distributed property exceeds the partnership’s pre-distribution basis by more than 
$250,000, then the partnership is required to reduce the basis of its remaining property. Id. 
§ 734(b), (d)(1). As noted, this treatment is elective in all other instances. Id. § 754. Once a 
partnership makes this election, however, it applies to all distributions, as well as certain sales of 
partnership interests. Id. For a more detailed discussion of these basis adjustments and their many 
challenges, see generally MCKEE ET AL., supra note 10, ¶ 24; WILLIS & POSTLEWAITE, supra 
note 54, ¶ 13.05; Howard Abrams, The Section 734(b) Basis Adjustment Needs Repair, 57 TAX 
LAW. 343 (2004); Andrews, supra note 7. 
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abuse without infringing on legitimate partnership distributions. To 
that end, these provisions all implement their recognition-based 
approach differently: some, like section 751(b), rely on a notional 
exchange between partner and partnership; and others, like the 
section 704(c)(1)(B) mixing bowl rule, rely on a hypothetical sale of 
partnership assets.122 
Their operational mechanics also vary, with each provision 
using different statutory tools to combat a particular abuse. As 
previously discussed, section 751(b) is grounded in technical rules 
that require a partnership to navigate seven steps and three imaginary 
transactions in recasting a disproportionate distribution.123 In 
contrast, the section 707(a)(2)(B) disguised sale rule relies on an 
open-textured standard to determine whether a contribution and 
distribution should be treated as a sale.124 The section 737 mixing 
bowl rule follows a third approach, turning on specialized 
terminology, such as “net pre-contribution gain,” to prevent income 
avoidance through a coordinated contribution and distribution.125 
These varied mechanics, in turn, ripple through each anti-abuse 
provision, often requiring customized basis adjustments and 
character rules at both the partner and partnership level.126 Together, 
 
 122. See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text. 
 123. See supra note 10. 
 124. See supra note 82. 
 125. I.R.C. § 737(b). When section 737 applies to a distribution, the distributee partner is 
required to recognize gain in an amount equal to the lesser of (1) the partner’s net pre-
contribution gain and (2) the difference between the fair market value of the distributed property 
and the partner’s outside basis immediately before the distribution. Id. § 737(a). A distributee 
partner’s “net pre-contribution gain” is the amount of gain that the partner would recognize under 
section 704(c)(1)(B) if any property she contributed to the partnership in the preceding seven-year 
period were distributed to another partner. Id. § 737(b). 
 126. When a partner or partnership recognizes gain under any of these anti-abuse provisions, 
the character of this gain must be determined. To that end, many of these anti-abuse provisions 
include special provisions governing how such character determinations are to be made. See, e.g., 
I.R.C. §§ 704(c)(1)(B)(ii) (character determined by a hypothetical sale), 737(a) (character 
determined by reference to proportionate character of the net pre-contribution gain); Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.751-1(b)(2)(iii), (3)(ii) (character determined by reference to the character of the property 
relinquished in the exchange). Similarly, these recognized gains often trigger basis adjustments. 
See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 704(c)(1)(B)(iii) (basis adjustments to contributed property and contributing 
partner’s outside basis), 737(c) (basis adjustments to contributed property and contributing 
partner’s outside basis); Treas. Reg. § 1.731-2(f) (basis adjustment to marketable securities 
distributed to a partner). In addition, section 751(b) requires the partnership to make basis 
adjustments in connection with each of its three fictional transactions. Treas. Reg. § 1.751-
1(b)(2), (3). 
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this operational diversity forms an additional layer of complexity for 
partnerships making distributions to their partners. 
Even so, the most formidable aspect of subchapter K’s 
distribution system is the system itself. The sheer number of 
provisions governing distributions is overwhelming to many, if not 
most, partnerships, especially when coupled with the provisions’ 
individual complexities. Navigating this system thus requires time, 
energy, and resources, all of which are often scarce. Indeed, 
complexity has made it virtually impossible for increasing numbers 
of partnerships to understand and apply subchapter K’s distribution 
system. 
b.  Inequity 
One might willingly tolerate some complexity in subchapter K’s 
distribution system if it effectively combated abusive transactions. 
Unfortunately, this has not been the case; partnership distributions 
remain inequitable, failing to tax partners based on their relative 
circumstances. 
A principle source of the inequity in partnership distributions is 
the system’s nonrecognition premise. Without the deferral that 
nonrecognition affords, much of the character conversion, income 
shifting, and income avoidance endemic to partnership distributions 
would not exist. Yet the anti-abuse provisions that Congress adopted 
to address these abuses have proven counterproductive, not 
achieving their equitable goals but contributing mightily to the legal 
complexity of partnership taxation. 
Just as design contributed to the distribution system’s 
complexity, it also contributed to its inequity. As previously 
discussed, Congress narrowly tailored subchapter K’s anti-abuse 
provisions in order to target particular tax shelters without impeding 
legitimate partnership transactions.127 For example, many of these 
anti-abuse provisions apply for a finite number of years: two in the 
case of the section 707(a)(2)(B) disguised sale rule; and seven in the 
case of the section 704(c)(1)(B) and 737 mixing bowl rules.128 
 
 127. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 128. I.R.C. §§ 704(c)(1)(B) (applies when property is contributed to the partnership and then 
distributed to another partner within the following seven-year period), 737(a)–(b) (applies when 
property is distributed to a partner that contributed property to the partnership during the seven-
year period preceding the distribution); Treas. Reg. § 1.707-3(c)(1), (d) (1992) (rebuttable 
presumptions that (1) a contribution and a distribution to the same partner that occur within a 
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Similarly, some anti-abuse provisions only apply once a distribution 
exceeds a specified monetary threshold.129 In both instances, 
however, these statutory limitations impair the overall efficacy of 
subchapter K’s efforts to prevent abusive distributions. Transactions 
structured outside these limitations continue unaffected, and 
partnerships are perhaps even emboldened by the expressive function 
of government line drawing. 
Of equal importance, many of these anti-abuse provisions are 
technically flawed. Section 751(b), for example, is replete with such 
flaws. In fairness, this was probably inevitable, as no single 
provision could be expected to combat all the abuses made possible 
by nonrecognition. Yet section 751(b)’s technical defects make it a 
particularly ill-suited defender of equity in partnership 
distributions.130 Partnership tax scholars have thus dedicated 
countless hours and pages to cataloguing section 751(b)’s flaws.131 I 
do not propose to recount the entire bill of particulars, but one 
 
two-year period are a disguised sale and (2) a contribution and a distribution to same partner that 
do not occur within a two-year period are not a disguised sale). 
 129. For instance, section 751(b)’s definition of “hot assets” only includes inventory, as 
defined in section 751(d), if it is substantially appreciated. I.R.C. § 751(b)(3)(A) (inventory will 
be considered “substantially appreciated” if its aggregate fair market value exceeds 120 percent of 
its aggregate basis); see also id. § 734(b), (d)(1) (requiring mandatory basis adjustment when the 
distributee partner recognizes a loss in excess of $250,000 or the partner’s basis in the distributed 
property exceeds the partnership’s pre-distribution basis in the property by more than $250,000). 
 130. Put another way, section 751(b), as currently drafted, does not succeed in preventing the 
abuses it was designed to combat. Nonetheless, the theory underlying section 751(b)—that 
liquidating distributions are taxable exchanges—is sound. Indeed, as will be discussed infra Part 
III.B, it may be the most sound aspect of subchapter K’s distribution regime. 
 131. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF TAXATION, COMMENTS CONCERNING NOTICE 
2006-14, reprinted in 2007 TAX NOTES TODAY 82-22 (Apr. 25, 2007); Andrews, supra note 7, at 
45–55; Burke, supra note 11, at 680–86; Noël B. Cunnngham, Needed Reform: Tending the Sick 
Rose, 47 TAX LAW REV. 77, 89–104 (1991); N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N TAX SECTION, REPORT 
RESPONDING TO NOTICE 2006-14 RELATING TO THE TREATMENT OF PARTNERSHIP 
DISTRIBUTIONS UNDER SECTION 751(B), reprinted in 2006 TAX NOTES TODAY 230-8 (Nov. 28, 
2006); Yin, supra note 5, at 233–38. A sampling of section 751(b)’s many technical flaws, as 
identified by these scholars, includes: (1) the definition of “hot asset”; (2) the “substantial 
appreciation” requirement for inventory; (3) the failure to extend section 751(b) treatment to 
depreciable assets; (4) the use of an exchange model, rather than a sale model, in determining the 
tax consequences of a disproportionate distribution; (5) the need to identify the assets 
hypothetically distributed to the partner in anticipation of the deemed exchange; and (6) the use of 
gross asset value to determine whether a distribution is disproportionate, which will be discussed 
herein. Id. As discussed supra note 89, the Treasury is considering its options for reforming 
section 751(b). I.R.S. Notice 2006-14, 2006-1 C.B. 498. In particular, it has requested comments 
on revisions designed to improve the regulation’s method of determining whether a distribution is 
disproportionate and to streamline the tax consequences associated with a recharacterized 
distribution. Id. § 3. 
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example might prove useful in illustrating how section 751(b) is its 
own worst enemy. 
Section 751(b)’s triggering mechanism is a perfect example of 
these flaws. As previously discussed, section 751(b) applies when a 
distributee partner receives a disproportionate share of a 
partnership’s ordinary, or hot, assets.132 To this end, each partner’s 
share of the partnership’s hot assets is determined based on gross 
asset value.133 If a partner holding a one-third partnership interest 
receives a distribution in complete liquidation of her partnership 
interest, she must receive one-third of the partnership’s hot assets, as 
determined by reference to their fair market value, in the distribution. 
If she does not, the distribution will trigger section 751(b). 
To illustrate, let’s return to the ABC equal partnership. This 
time, however, let’s assume that the partnership holds three assets—
Blueacre, Inventory #1, and Inventory #2. C wishes to retire from the 
partnership and, at this time, the partnership has the following 
balance sheet: 
 
Assets Basis Value Capital Basis  Value 
      
Inventory #1 100 100 A 150 200 
Inventory #2    50 200 B 150 200 
Blueacre 300 300 C 150 200 
Total 450 600  450 600 
 
 
To accommodate C’s decision, the partnership distributes a portion 
of Blueacre with a fair market value of $100 and Inventory #1 to C in 
complete liquidation of her partnership interest. Under section 
751(b)’s triggering mechanism, this distribution would not be 
considered disproportionate. Before the distribution, the 
partnership’s hot assets were worth $300, and the partners shared this 
 
 132. See supra notes 92 and accompanying text. 
 133. Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(g), exs. 2, 3. 
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aggregate hot asset value equally, $100 each.134 C received Inventory 
#1 in the distribution when its fair market value was $100. She 
would thus have received exactly her share of the partnership’s hot 
assets, as determined by their gross asset value, in the transaction, 
hence avoiding the section 751(b) disproportionate distribution 
rule.135 
Herein lies a problem. This distribution would be abusive, 
converting the character of C’s built-in gain from ordinary to capital 
and shifting income among the partners. Prior to the distribution, 
there was a $150 built-in gain in Inventory #2; if the partnership had 
sold the property, it would have recognized a $150 ordinary gain.136 
In turn, each partner’s share of this ordinary gain would have been 
$50.137 Inventory #1, in contrast, had no built-in gain because its fair 
market value equaled its basis. 
The distribution in complete liquidation of C’s interest would 
change these shares, yet section 751(b) would treat the transaction as 
a proportionate distribution, failing to respond to the resulting 
inequities. Consider the tax consequences to C. She would not 
recognize a gain on the distribution; instead her $50 built-in gain 
would be preserved for future recognition on a sale of Blueacre.138 In 
determining C’s basis in the distributed property, the partnership 
would begin with her pre-distribution outside basis of $150, which it 
would allocate between Blueacre and Inventory #1.139 As previously 
 
 134. The partnership holds two hot assets—Inventory #1 and Inventory #2—with a total fair 
market value of $300 ($100 fair market value of Inventory #1 plus $200 fair market value of 
Inventory #2). As a one-third partner in the partnership, each partner’s share of this aggregate fair 
market value is $100 ($300 aggregate fair market value of hot assets * 1/3). 
 135. Similarly, C would have received exactly her share of cold assets. Before the 
distribution, Blueacre was worth $300, and each partner shared this value equally, $100 each. C 
then receives a portion of Blueacre with a fair market value of $100. 
 136. At the time of distribution, Inventory #2 had a fair market value of $200 and a basis of 
$50. 
 137. As one-third partners, each partner’s share of this recognized gain would have been $50 
($150 * 1/3). 
 138. I.R.C. § 731(a)(1) (2006). 
 139. Id. § 732(b), (c). In a complete liquidating distribution, the distributee partner’s basis in 
the distributed property equals her pre-distribution outside basis less the amount of cash received 
in the distribution. Id. § 732(b). If the partner’s outside basis is not sufficient to allow her to take 
a basis in each item of distributed property equal to the partnership’s pre-distribution basis in the 
property, then her post-distribution basis in the distributed property must be reduced. Section 
732(c), which provides the rules governing the allocation of this basis reduction among the 
distributed property, requires a partnership to first allocate basis to any distributed hot assets. Id. 
§ 732(c)(1)(A)(i). Any outside basis remaining after this priority allocation is then allocated to the 
distributed cold assets. Id. § 732(c)(1)(B). 
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discussed, this basis allocation is achieved through a statutory basis 
adjustment.140 Under these provisions, hot assets receive a priority 
allocation of basis; hence, C would take a $100 basis in Inventory #1, 
which equals the partnership’s basis in the property.141 C’s remaining 
outside basis of $50 would then be allocated to Blueacre, which has a 
$100 fair market value at the time of distribution.142 If C were to sell 
Blueacre following the distribution, she would recognize a $50 
capital gain, thereby effecting an improper character conversion. 
Indeed, the distribution would have resulted in precisely the type of 
character conversion that section 751(b) was designed to prevent. 
Likewise, the distribution would produce inequitable results for 
the remaining partners, A and B. After the distribution, the 
partnership would have the following balance sheet: 
 
Assets Basis Value Capital Basis  Value 
      
Inventory   50 200 A 150 200 
Blueacre  200 200 B 150 200 
Total 250 400  300 400 
 
 
The distribution would increase their respective shares of Inventory 
#2’s built-in gain by $25, from $50 to $75. If the partnership were to 
sell Inventory #2 after the distribution, it would recognize a gain of 
$150 and allocate it equally between A and B, $75 each. In doing so, 
the distribution would have improperly shifted $25 of Inventory #2’s 
pre-distribution built-in gain to each of the remaining partners.143 
 
 140. Id. § 732(b); see supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 141. Id. § 732(c)(1)(A)(i). 
 142. Id. § 732(c)(1)(B). 
 143. As previously discussed, this shift is only temporary; it will reverse itself when the 
partners sell or liquidate their respective partnership interests. See Andrews, supra note 63. 
Likewise, this is a situation that would trigger a basis adjustment under section 734(b) if the 
partnership had made the proper election. I.R.C. §§ 734(b), 754. This elective basis adjustment 
would allow the partnership to adjust its basis in the remainder of Blueacre to reflect the $50 of 
basis “lost” in the distribution to C. Id. § 734(b)(1)(B). Section 734(b), even if elected by the 
partnership, is an imperfect fix to this problem. Although it prevents the income shift, it fails to 
address the character conversion. If the partnership were to make a basis adjustment, it would 
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The culprit is section 751(b)’s triggering mechanism, which 
relies on gross asset value to determine whether a distribution is 
disproportionate. Value, as can be seen in the previous example, is 
the wrong measure of disproportionality because it fails to capture 
the distributions that section 751(b) was enacted to combat—
distributions that alter the amount or character of a partner’s share of 
the partnership’s pre-distribution built-in gain. A triggering 
mechanism proceeding from built-in gain, one that requires an 
examination of the relationship between a property’s value and its 
basis, would better align section 751(b) with its equitable goals. 
Despite repeated efforts to reform section 751(b)’s triggering rule, it 
remains grounded in gross asset value.144 And section 751(b) thus 
remains counterproductive, allowing partnerships to alter the amount 
and character of their partners’ shares of pre-distribution built-in gain 
in violation of equitable norms. 
Of equal importance, subchapter K’s distribution system also 
compromises vertical equity.145 Modern partnerships are immensely 
polarized, with sophisticated, well-advised partnerships pursuing tax 
shelters at one extreme, and simple, commercially focused 
partnerships at the other extreme. In large part, subchapter K’s 
distribution system evolved in response to the small number of 
partnerships engaged in abusive transactions. Yet its complicated 
provisions apply to all partnerships, whether big, small, 
 
increase the basis of Blueacre by $50, from $200 to $250. Id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.755-1(c)(1)(i). In 
doing so, the basis adjustment would create a $50 built-in capital loss in Blueacre, which A and B 
would share equally, $25 each. Thus, each remaining partner would have a net built-in gain of 
$50—a $25 built-in capital loss attributable to Blueacre and a $75 built-in ordinary gain 
attributable to Inventory #2. Even though their net built-in gains would remain unchanged, A and 
B may still be worse off in this situation due the limitations on capital losses. I.R.C. § 1211(b). 
 144. See, e.g., MCKEE ET AL., supra note 10, ¶ 21.01[2]; Andrews, supra note 7, at 48–49; 
Burke, supra note 11, at 685; Gergen, supra note 30, at 353–54. As discussed supra note 131, the 
Treasury is considering an alternative method of determining whether a distribution is 
disproportionate. I.R.S. Notice 2006-14, 2006-1 C.B. 498. More specifically, the Treasury has 
requested comments on the “hypothetical sale approach” to the disproportionality determination. 
Id. Under this approach, a partnership would compare the amount of ordinary income that would 
be recognized by its partners if it sold all of its hot assets, including any hot asset distributed to its 
partners, for their fair market value immediately before and immediately after the distribution at 
issue. Id. A distribution would be disproportionate if any partner’s allocated share of ordinary 
income decreased as a result of the distribution. Id. Additionally, the partnership would be 
required to take into account section 704(c) principles, namely a revaluation of the partnership’s 
property, in making this determination. Id. In doing so, it is hoped that a significantly smaller 
number of distributions would trigger section 751(b).  
 145. See WITTE, supra note 15. 
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sophisticated, or simple.146 Everyday partnerships, which share little 
in common with sheltering partnerships, thus bear a disproportionate 
burden, financial and otherwise, for the abusive behavior of a 
minority of partnerships. 
c.  Instability 
Throughout the past half-century, subchapter K’s distribution 
system has become a technical minefield with few guides for 
partnerships attempting to navigate its provisions. The system lacks 
the unifying ties necessary to foster stability in partnership 
distributions. The result is incoherence; partnerships often do not 
know what the law of distributions is. 
Consider the average partnership making a distribution to one of 
its partners. This partnership might know, as a general matter, that a 
distribution is a nonrecognition event; thus, the partnership may 
expect that neither it nor the distributee partner will recognize gain 
on the transaction. Imagine this partnership’s dismay at learning that 
subchapter K’s general nonrecognition rule is subject to at least four 
separate anti-abuse provisions, any of which might require gain 
recognition.147 Further, each of these provisions operates differently, 
requiring the partnership to work through four triggers and four 
computational analyses in determining the tax consequences of this 
one distribution.148 Perhaps more surprising, some of these anti-
abuse provisions may require gain recognition by the non-distributee 
partners as well, who receive nothing in the distribution.149 
 
 146. See, e.g., Lawrence Lokken, As the World of Partnership Taxation Turns, 56 SMU L. 
REV. 365, 367 (2003) (“The revolutionary accretion of detail in subchapter K is largely a 
response to aggressive uses of partnerships for tax avoidance . . . The dilemma of subchapter K is 
that rules considered essential to the effective application of the tax laws to some partnerships and 
their partners apply to all partnerships, including those utterly lacking in capability to apply the 
rules, which likely comprise a large majority of all partnerships.”); Yin, supra note 5, at 191 
(“Although larger businesses would also benefit from simplification, they might have alternative 
means not available to smaller businesses of coping with tax law complexity.”). 
 147. Even the Service recognizes this inconsistency between the commercial expectations of 
many partners and the current state of subchapter K’s distribution system: “Although the general 
rule aims to treat partnership distributions as nontaxable events, the exceptions can quickly 
overshadow the general rule.” INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PARTNERSHIP–AUDIT TECHNIQUE 
GUIDE CH. 4 (2007). 
 148. See supra notes 122–26 and accompanying text. 
 149. I.R.C. §§ 707(a)(2)(B), 751(b) (2006). With respect to section 751(b), the Treasury is 
considering an alternative to current law’s exchange method of determining the tax consequences 
of a triggering distribution. I.R.S. Notice 2006-14, 2006-1 C.B. 498. Under the proposed “hot 
asset sale approach,” a disproportionate distribution would be recast as a two-step transaction: (1) 
TAXING REALITY 10/7/2014 6:48 PM 
704 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:657 
Subchapter K’s distribution system is indeed tangled, often 
running contrary to partnerships’ expectations. Considered in this 
light, it is no wonder that so many partnerships struggle to 
understand and apply the law of partnership distributions. 
3.  The Compliance Crisis 
The true cost of this dysfunctionality is reflected in declining 
compliance across the partnership spectrum. Distributions are a 
minefield for the average partnership, with traps for the unwary at 
every turn. The complexity and cost of accessing this discordant 
system have made full compliance virtually impossible for many, if 
not most, partnerships. Consider, for instance, this description of 
section 751(b): 
[Section 751(b)’s] application is not recognized in [ninety] 
percent of the cases to which it applies . . . In half the cases 
in which its applicability is recognized, the other remaining 
[ten] percent, it is ignored because the cost of complying is 
far greater than any revenue gain, and in, I would say, half 
of the remaining [five] percent, when people including the 
Internal Revenue Service, attempt to apply it, they do so 
incorrectly.150 
Well-intentioned partnerships are thus left with few good options. 
They can try to run subchapter K’s gauntlet, taking the risk of falling 
 
a distribution of the partner’s share of the relinquished hot assets; and (2) a subsequent taxable 
sale of the hot assets back to the partnership immediately before the actual distribution. Id. Unlike 
current law, the partner relinquishing a share of the partnership’s cold assets would no longer 
recognize gain on the disproportionate distribution. Numerous commentators have proposed 
“tweaks” to this hot asset sale approach, all of which are designed to produce comparable results 
with less complexity. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF TAXATION, supra note 131, at  
24–25; N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N TAX SECTION, supra note 131, at 37–50; Karen C. Burke, 
Remedying Flaws in the Hot Asset Sale Approach, 116 TAX NOTES 279 (2007). 
 150. Issues Relating to Passthrough Entities: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select 
Revenue Measures of the U.S. H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 99th Cong. 56 (1986) (statement of 
Joel Rabinovitz). Mr. Rabinovitz is not alone in his assessment of section 751(b). See, e.g., AM. 
LAW INST. SUBCHAPTER K PROJECT, supra note 11, at 51 (“If the reports of noncompliance with 
Section 751(b) are correct, the continuance of such a provision must have an adverse bearing on 
taxpayer respect for the law.”); Berger, supra note 11, at 147 (describing section 751(b) as one 
“of subchapter K’s least understood and most widely ignored provisions”); Eustice, supra note 
11, at 383 (“Section 751(b) is difficult to understand and complex in operation, and as a 
consequence it is probably largely unenforced. It may be the Achilles heel of subchapter K.”); 
Hanna, supra note 11, at 524 (“The almost unanimous consensus has been that section 751(b) 
should never have been enacted or, at the very least, should have been repealed years ago.”); 
Lokken, supra note 5, at 277 (describing subchapter K’s distribution system as “one of the 
principle repositories of unworkable complexity” in partnership taxation).  
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into one of its many distribution-related traps. Or, they can forego 
technical compliance and instead follow what scholars call an 
“intuitive subchapter K,” doing the best they can with available 
resources and hoping to escape the attention of the Internal Revenue 
Service (“Service”).151 In either case, the result is troublesome—
subchapter K’s distribution system appears to be honored largely in 
the breach.152 
In contrast, distributions continue to be a treasure trove for the 
small number of partnerships pursuing tax shelters. Subchapter K’s 
complicated anti-abuse provisions are often incomplete, leaving gaps 
for tax shelters and offering roadmaps for future abusive 
transactions. Further, sheltering partnerships benefit from the 
noncompliance of nonsheltering partnerships, which shields their 
abuse from detection by the Service. Indeed, these partnerships 
capitalize on the struggles of the average partnership by using the 
overall dysfunctionality of partnership distributions to their financial 
advantage. 
When compliance falters, the public cost is significant. Tax 
revenues suffer, and partners question the fairness of the distribution 
system and subchapter K, more generally. A vicious cycle emerges 
where noncompliance, public illegitimacy, and discord reinforce one 
another. The resulting instability breeds frustration among partners 
who, in turn, are more inclined to perceive subchapter K as corrupt. 
 
 151. Lokken, supra note 146, at 367 (“[W]e already have a K lite, consisting of the present 
subchapter K stripped of all the rules and nuances that tax practitioners serving ordinary 
partnerships do not understand and simply ignore.”); Lokken, supra note 5, at 252 (“A large 
number of partnerships thus seem to be governed by what might be called an ‘intuitive subchapter 
K.’ Taxpayers and tax advisers who want to comply account for partnership transactions in ways 
that are consistent with their conceptions of the basic aims of subchapter K.”); Yin, supra note 5, 
at 201 (“[I]t may well be that many small firms . . . already utilize a watered-down, intuitive 
version of subchapter K.”). 
One might wonder why an intuitive subchapter K is problematic, especially if most 
partnerships can approximate the right result without incurring the expense of navigating 
subchapter K’s complexity. See Philip F. Postlewaite, I Come to Bury Subchapter K, Not to 
Praise It, 54 TAX LAW. 451, 473 (2001). Ultimately, this is an empirical question, and the answer 
depends on how “close” the results are under an intuitive subchapter K. Yet the empirical work 
necessary to analyze this claim regarding partner compliance has not been done, and the 
substantive work of reforming partnership taxation must proceed. Thus, we must proceed 
provisionally using reasonable working assumptions about partnership compliance. To that end, 
this Article assumes that non-sheltering partnerships want to follow the law and, thus, a system 
where large numbers of partnerships are excluded from the possibility of “perfect” compliance is 
problematic. 
 152. Lokken, supra note 146, at 365–66; Yin, supra note 5, at 235. 
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These partners are thus more likely to engage in abusive 
distributions, which often provoke counterproductive responses from 
the government, further entrenching complexity, inequity, and 
instability in partnership distributions. 
E.  The Problem of Nonrecognition 
Partnership distributions are deeply flawed, with challenges 
almost too numerous to count. Subchapter K’s complicated 
distribution provisions, their relationship to one another, and their 
impact on partnership taxation as a whole are entirely dysfunctional. 
Calls for reforming or repealing subchapter K’s most troublesome 
provisions, particularly section 751(b), thus began shortly after 
codification in 1954 and continue to this day.153 
Yet these calls misconstrue the problem posed by partnership 
distributions. Section 751(b) is not the problem; nor are any of 
subchapter K’s individual provisions, despite their many flaws. 
 
 153. See supra note 11. In 1999, the Clinton Administration proposed repealing section 
751(b) as part of a larger, coordinated reform of partnership distributions. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S REVENUE PROPOSALS 134 
(1999), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-
Explanations-FY2000.pdf; STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF 
REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2000 BUDGET PROPOSAL 
237 (Comm. Print 1999), available at https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id 
=1225. Despite this laudable effort at comprehensive distribution reform, the Clinton 
Administration’s proposals were not well received by many members of the partnership tax 
community. See, e.g., Ernst & Young LLP, Analysis of the Administration’s Partnership 
Proposals, 84 TAX NOTES 103 (1999); Barton Massey, McKee Blasts Administration’s Tax 
Shelter/Partnership Proposals, 1999 TAX NOTES TODAY 48-8 (Mar. 12, 1999). But see Karen C. 
Burke, Reassessing the Administration’s Proposals for Reform of Subchapter K, 86 TAX NOTES 
1423 (2000). Recently, Representative Dave Camp, Chairman of the Committee on Ways and 
Means, released a discussion draft targeted at pass-through tax reform. H. COMM. ON WAYS AND 
MEANS, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE DISCUSSION DRAFT 
PROVISIONS TO REFORM THE TAXATION OF SMALL BUSINESS AND PASSTHROUGH ENTITIES 
(2013), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/final_sm_bus_passthrough 
_technical_explanation_03_12_13.pdf [hereinafter, COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 2013 
PASSTHROUGH DISCUSSION DRAFT]; see also Karen C. Burke, Pass-Through Entities: The 
Missing Element in Business Tax Reform, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1329 (2013); George K. Yin, 
Comments on Selected Draft Reforms of the House Committee on Ways & Means on the Taxation 
of Passthrough Entities, 140 TAX NOTES 358 (2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com 
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2275324; Williard B. Taylor, Should There Be One Set of 
Passthrough Rules for All Non-Publicly Traded Businesses? (Option 2 of the Ways and Means 
Committee Draft to Reform the Taxation of Small Business and Passthrough Entities) 
(Oct. 22, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=2343776. Representative Camp’s discussion draft offers two options for the 
reform of subchapter K and S. Interestingly, both proposals retain section 751(b), expanding its 
scope to treat all inventory, rather than just substantially appreciated inventory, as hot assets. Id. 
at 30–31, 57.  
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Nonrecognition—the central premise of subchapter K’s distribution 
system—is the problem. Fixing partnership distributions thus 
requires fixing nonrecognition, not the anti-abuse provisions 
designed to combat particular transactions that exploit subchapter 
K’s liberal distribution system. Indeed, a continued focus on these 
anti-abuse provisions only exacerbates the problem with partnership 
distributions, perpetuating the vicious cycle that is rooted in the 
system’s core nonrecognition premise. 
If recognition were instead the rule, partnerships would no 
longer be able to defer built-in gains; hence, distributions would no 
longer create opportunities for partnerships to convert character, shift 
income, or avoid the recognition of gain. In turn, there would be no 
need for so many intricate anti-abuse provisions to prevent improper 
distributions. Partnership distributions would thus look very different 
than they do today: simpler, more equitable, and more stable. 
The time has come to rethink partnership distributions, 
beginning with the nonrecognition premise at the system’s 
foundation. An alternative vision of partnership distributions, one 
without the imprint of nonrecognition, is needed. 
III.  RETHINKING PARTNERSHIP DISTRIBUTIONS 
This Article takes first steps toward greater functionality and 
harmony in partnership distributions, reimagining these transactions 
from a recognition-based perspective. In describing the challenge of 
designing a viable system of taxing distributions before subchapter 
K’s codification, one scholar noted that: 
It is a pleasant bit of mental gymnastics to criticize the 
patchwork system that has developed, and to demand with 
righteous indignation that the Treasury and the courts 
cooperate in a coherent and consistent matter of taxation. It 
is a grimmer job, however, to formulate a set of rules which 
will be consistent in theory, equitable in effect, and simple 
in practice. The dilemma is nicely illustrated by one 
fundamental problem, that of distributions in kind to a 
partner. The challenge is to draft a statute which will 
extricate taxpayer and Government from their present 
difficulties, by neatly correlating the answers in terms of 
partnership gain, or loss, partnership basis, partners’ gains 
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or losses, and partners’ bases. It should be possible—or so 
one would think.154 
These words are equally true today, sixty years later. Rethinking 
distributions is a daunting task, but it is one that can no longer be 
ignored. 
In rethinking distributions, I draw inspiration from an unlikely 
source—the disproportionate distribution rule of section 751(b). 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, section 751(b) got the theory of 
partnership distributions right, treating liquidating distributions as 
taxable exchanges. When considered in this light, section 751(b)’s 
principal flaw is not its complexity, or even its inability to prevent 
abuse. Rather, it is the provision’s failure to treat all liquidating 
distributions as recognition events. Expanding recognition may thus 
hold the solution to the seemingly intractable problem of partnership 
distributions. 
This Article thus proposes dividing distributions into two 
categories—operating distributions and liquidating distributions—in 
order to rationalize their treatment. Operating distributions would 
continue to be treated as preemptively tax-free transactions in which 
the distribution itself has no impact on the relationship among the 
partners. Liquidating distributions, however, would be treated as 
taxable exchanges between the partnership and the distributee 
partner. 
I do not mean to suggest that a recognition-based approach to 
distributions is perfect, or perfectly simple. It is neither. But a 
recognition-based approach would align the tax treatment of 
liquidating distributions with their commercial substance, 
recognizing these transactions’ economically transformative effect 
on partnerships and their partners. In so doing, this proposal would 
offer a simpler, more equitable, and more stable system of taxing 
distributions. A recognition rule would create a pathway to a more 
coherent subchapter K, one that would be more accessible to the 
many partnerships that are struggling, and often failing, to navigate 
the current law. 
 
 154. Mark H. Johnson, Notes: Property Distributions by Partners, 4 TAX L. REV. 118, 118 
(1948) (footnotes omitted). 
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A.  Recognition-Based Distributions 
In reimagining partnership distributions, I propose two 
foundational changes to subchapter K: redefining distributions and 
reformulating their tax consequences. Simplification should be a 
priority, with provisions that are accessible to partnerships at all 
levels of wealth and sophistication. Likewise, a reformed distribution 
system should prioritize equity. Partnership distributions should not 
alter the amount or character of any partner’s share of the 
partnership’s pre-distribution built-in gain. If the partnership cannot 
preserve these amounts for future recognition by the appropriate 
partner, then such partner should recognize gain at the time of 
distribution. A greater focus on simplicity and equity, in turn, would 
foster stability in the tax treatment of distributions, providing 
partnerships with a coherent guide through subchapter K’s 
distribution system. 
1.  Property Distributions 
Reforming partnership distributions begins with economic 
reality. A starting point in this project is thus the tax treatment of 
property distributions. In these transactions, a partnership terminates 
its investment in the distributed property, potentially altering the 
amount and character of each partner’s share of the property’s built-
in gain. Considered in this light, treating property distributions as 
taxable transactions in all instances is appropriate; it would better 
match the tax consequences of these distributions with their 
commercial reality.155 
Under this proposal, a partnership would recognize gain on the 
distribution of appreciated property.156 The partnership would 
 
 155. This proposal would align the partnership-level treatment of property distributions with 
the treatment of property distributions by C corporations and S corporations. I.R.C. §§ 311(b), 
336(a), 1371(a) (as amended in 2006). Under these provisions, a corporation recognizes gain on 
the distribution of appreciated property in all instances. Id. § 311(b). Losses, in contrast, are only 
recognized when property is distributed in complete liquidation of the corporation. Id. § 336(a). 
This approach also mirrors the current capital account treatment of property distributions, which 
requires a partnership to recognize any economic gains and losses in the distributed property 
before it is transferred to the distributee partner. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(e)(1) (2013). 
 156. Taxing property distributions at the partnership level, standing alone, would represent an 
important step forward in rationalizing the tax treatment of partnership distributions. It thus could 
be severed from the remainder of this Article’s proposal. Indeed, numerous scholars have 
proposed taxing property distributions in this manner as part of larger reform projects. See, e.g., 
Berger, supra note 11, at 154; Eustice, supra note 11, at 383–84; Gergen, supra note 11, at 220–
23; Jeffrey L. Kwall, Taxing Private Enterprise in the New Millennium, 51 TAX LAW. 229, 258–
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compute the amount and character of this gain based on a 
hypothetical sale of the distributed property at its fair market value 
immediately before the distribution. The partnership would then 
allocate the recognized gain among all its partners, including the 
distributee partner, according to their pre-distribution sharing 
arrangement.157 Each partner would increase her outside basis 
accordingly to reflect her share of this recognized gain, and the basis 
of the distributed property would be similarly increased. 
       To illustrate, let’s return to the ABC partnership. This time, let’s 
assume that the partnership has three assets: cash, inventory, and a 
new investment property (“Orangeacre”). Imagine that the 
partnership distributes Orangeacre to C in partial liquidation of her 
partnership interest. Immediately before the distribution, the 






61 (1998); Lokken, supra note 5, at 277; Postlewaite et al., supra note 11, at 604, 606–07; Yin, 
supra note 5, at 229. In addition, the House Ways and Means Committee recently issued a 
discussion draft of provisions designed to reform the taxation of pass-through entities. See 
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 2013 PASSTHROUGH DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 153. Under 
its uniform proposal for the taxation of pass-through entities, pass-through entities would 
recognize gain, but not loss, on the distribution of property to their owners. Id. at 50–51. 
 157. As previously discussed, supra note 117, one might argue that taxing the distributee 
partner on her share of the distributed property’s gain would be inappropriate. See Burke, supra 
note 11, at 698. To the extent that the distributee partner is treated as directly owning her share of 
the distributed property, the liquidating distribution would have little effect, simply transferring 
property to the distributee partner that, under the aggregate theory of partnerships, she would 
already be treated as owning. When considered in this light, the distributee partner would be 
overtaxed if she were required to recognize gain attributable to this portion of the distributed 
property. Id. 
Consistent with the aggregate theory of partnerships, one could address this problem 
through a hybrid recognition/nonrecognition approach. The distributee partner would not 
recognize her share of the gain on the transfer of the distributed property. This share of built-in 
gain would be deferred, instead recognized by the distributee partner in the future when she sells 
the distributed property. In order to implement this approach, a basis adjustment provision would 
be necessary, requiring the distributee partner to take a basis in the distributed property that 
reflects the amount of pre-distribution built-in gain deferred on the distribution. Although perhaps 
a more technically “pure” approach to partnership distributions, I have decided against this hybrid 
approach because of the additional complexity that it would introduce into a reformed distribution 
system. 
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Assets Basis Value Capital Basis  Value 
      
Cash 400 400 A 160 200 
Inventory   10 100 B 160 200 
Orangeacre 70 100 C 160 200 
Total 480 600  480 600 
 
 
At the partnership level, the distribution would be treated as a fully 
taxable transaction, and the partnership would recognize 
Orangeacre’s $30 built-in gain. If the partnership had sold 
Orangeacre for its fair market value of $100 rather than distributing 
the property to C, it would have recognized a $30 capital gain.158 
Each partner would thus recognize a $10 capital gain in connection 
with Orangeacre’s distribution and increase her outside basis 
accordingly, from $160 to $170.159 The partnership, in turn, would 
increase its basis in Orangeacre by $30, from $70 to $100. 
At this point, the partnership would have the following balance 
sheet: 
 
Assets Basis Value Capital Basis  Value 
      
Cash 400 400 A 170 200 
Inventory   10 100 B 170 200 
Orangeacre 100 100 C 170 200 




 158. Orangeacre had a fair market value of $100 immediately before the distribution, and its 
basis was $70. Thus, the partnership’s sale of the property would have resulted in a recognized 
gain of $30. I.R.C. § 1001. Because the partnership held Orangeacre as investment property, this 
$30 gain would have been a capital gain. Id. § 1221(a). 
 159. Id. §§ 704(b), 705(a)(1)(A). 
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Each partner would thus be taxed on her share of Orangeacre’s built-
in gain. Consistent with equitable norms, the distribution would not 
alter the amount or character of any partner’s share of this gain.160 
2.  Redefining Partnership Distributions 
At the partner-level, the tax treatment of partnership 
distributions should reflect the commercial substance of these 
common, but diverse, transactions. This proposal thus begins with 
the premise that operating distributions and liquidating distributions 
are fundamentally different transactions. Operating distributions are 
largely invisible; they do not affect the partners’ relationship to the 
partnership, its property, or its profits. Considered in this light, the 
current law’s general nonrecognition rule is well suited to this type 
of distribution.161 Liquidating distributions, in contrast, involve an 
economic transformation of the partnership, with a partner 
terminating her investment in the enterprise in whole or in part. 
Accordingly, treating these distributions as taxable exchanges 
between the partner and the partnership is more appropriate. 
To implement this reformed distribution system, it is necessary 
to define operating distributions and liquidating distributions. Under 
this proposal, operating distributions would typically involve ratable 
distributions. These distributions do not alter the partners’ respective 
interests in the partnership; hence, they would remain largely tax-free 
transactions.162 Liquidating distributions, in contrast, would include 
all distributions where a partner terminates any portion of her 
investment in the partnership. In doing so, all distributions, whether 
 
 160. The tax consequences of the distribution to C, the distributee partner, will be discussed 
infra Part III.A.3. 
 161. This Article, however, does propose several changes to the general nonrecognition 
treatment of partnership distributions, all narrowing the parameters of the current law’s 
nonrecognition rule. The primary changes involve the partnership’s recognition of gain on any 
distribution of property. See supra Part III.A.1. The remaining changes will be discussed infra 
note 162 and accompanying text. 
 162. As a general matter, a partner would not recognize gain on the receipt of an operating 
distribution. Rather, she would reduce her outside basis by the amount of cash received or the 
basis she takes in any distributed property. There would, however, be one exception to this rule: if 
the cash or the fair market value of any distributed property exceeds the distributee partner’s 
outside basis, then she would recognize a gain equal to such excess. Similarly, this proposal 
would require the partnership to make a corresponding adjustment to the basis of its remaining 
property in order reflect the gain recognized by the distributee partner. In doing so, subchapter 
K’s distribution system would ensure that each partner’s share of the partnership’s pre-
distribution built-in gains are properly preserved. 
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complete or partial, that affect the amount or character of a partner’s 
share of the partnership’s pre-distribution built-in gain would be 
treated as liquidating distributions and subject to the recognition-
based treatment proposed herein.163 
At the extremes, distinguishing operating distributions and 
liquidating distributions is relatively straight forward: ratable 
distributions are operating distributions and distributions in complete 
liquidation of a partner’s partnership interest are liquidating 
distributions. But identifying partial liquidating distributions presents 
a greater challenge, one requiring additional guidance as to the 
proper treatment of non-ratable distributions. As previously 
discussed, economic reality is the driver of this recognition-based 
approach to distributions. To that end, this proposal would treat a 
non-ratable distribution as a liquidating distribution if it alters the 
amount or character of a partner’s share of pre-distribution 
partnership built-in gain, as reflected in the partners’ sharing 
arrangement.164 Accordingly, changes in the partners’ method of 
sharing partnership profits, particularly gains derived from the 
disposition of its property, would be central to defining partial 
liquidating distributions.165 
 
 163. See infra Part III.A.3. 
 164. This is currently the trigger for a revaluation of the partnership’s property. Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f)(5)(ii) (2013). Under this provision, a partnership may elect to revalue its 
asset in connection with a distribution of money or property “by the partnership to a retiring or 
continuing partner as consideration for an interest in the partnership.” Id. 
 165. In proposing a recognition-based approach to liquidating distributions, one scholar 
would require the partners to enter into various agreements designed to memorialize the change in 
each partner’s interest in the partnership. Postlewaite et al., supra note 11, at 598–99. Under this 
proposal, the partners would be required to execute the following agreements within thirty days 
of any liquidating distribution: (1) an allocation agreement, specifying the fair market value of all 
of the partnership’s property; and (2) a sales agreement, specifying the partnership interest to be 
sold and its selling price. Id. at 599. Other scholars have proposed alternative means of 
identifying and quantifying partial liquidating distributions. One method focuses on the 
proportionate reduction in a partner’s partnership interest. See AM. LAW INST., MEMORANDUM 
NO. 3, supra note 11, at 37–40. This proportionate reduction method relies on a mathematical 
formula to distinguish ratable distributions from non-ratable partial liquidating distributions. See 
AM. LAW INST., MEMORANDUM NO. 3, supra note 11, at 40 (adopting the formula (1 − b/a) / (1 − 
b), where “a” equals the distributee partner’s pre-distribution interest in the entity and “b” equals 
her post-distribution interest in the entity). Another method focuses on the relative value of the 
distribution. See, e.g., STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, REVIEW OF SELECTED ENTITY 
CLASSIFICATION AND PARTNERSHIP TAX ISSUES 35–36 (Comm. Print 1997), available at 
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=2071 (comparing the fair market 
value of property distributed to the pre-distribution fair market value of the distributee partner’s 
partnership interest). In many instances, all of these methods arrive at the same result. See infra 
note 170 and accompanying text for an example of a distribution that would be treated as a partial 
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To illustrate how these definitions work, consider again the ABC 
partnership. Let’s assume that the partnership is considering making 
a variety of distributions. Before it engages in any of these 
transactions, it has the following balance sheet: 
 
Assets Basis Value Capital Basis  Value 
      
Cash 400 400 A 160 200 
Inventory   10 100 B 160 200 
Orangeacre 70 100 C 160 200 
Total 480 600  480 600 
 
 
Imagine that the partnership distributes $50 of cash to all three 
partners. This transaction would qualify as an operating distribution. 
Each partner would receive her respective share of the partnership’s 
previously taxed income; the distribution has no other effect. Before 
and after the transaction, each partner holds an equal one-third 
interest in the partnership. Likewise, the amount and character of 
each partner’s pre-distribution share of the partnership’s built-in 
gains would be preserved. Indeed, the partnership would have the 
following balance sheet after the distribution: 
 
Assets Basis Value Capital Basis  Value 
      
Cash 250 250 A 110 150 
Inventory   10 100 B 110 150 
Orangeacre 70 100 C 110 150 
Total 330 450  330 450 
 
liquidating distribution under all of these methods. Nonetheless, further study is required to 
determine whether one method would be superior to the others, or whether a standards-based 
approach that would allow partnerships to account for all relevant facts and circumstances would 
be preferable. 
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The tax treatment of the ABC partnership’s distribution would 
remain largely unchanged under this proposal.166 Neither the 
partnership nor the partners would recognize a gain on the 
distribution.167 Each partner would instead reduce her outside basis 
to reflect the amount of cash distributed, from $160 to $110.168 
The tax consequences would be the same if the partnership had 
made a series of cash distributions that, when taken together, were 
proportionate. More generally, if a partnership makes a series of 
individual distributions during the taxable year that, when 
aggregated, are proportionate, then the series of distributions would 
be treated as a single operating distribution.169 For instance, imagine 
that the ABC partnership had staggered its $50 cash distributions, 
with A receiving her distribution in April, B in June, and C in 
November. Considered individually, these distributions may not 
qualify as operating distributions. But, together, they would be 
treated as a single operating distribution, effecting no change in the 
partners’ interests in the partnership. 
Alternatively, let’s now assume that the ABC partnership does 
not distribute cash to its partners. Instead, it distributes Orangeacre to 
C in partial liquidation of her partnership interest. C relinquishes 
one-half of her partnership interest in the distribution, thus 
decreasing her interest in the enterprise from one-third to one-fifth 
and increasing A’s and B’s respective interests from one-third to two-
fifths. This distribution would be treated as a liquidating distribution 
where C terminates a portion of her investment in the partnership.170 
Under this proposal, the tax consequences of this transaction—a 
 
 166. For a discussion of the proposed changes to the tax treatment of operating distributions, 
see supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text. 
 167. I.R.C. § 731(a)(1), (b) (2006). 
 168. Id. § 732(a)(1).  
 169. This aggregation rule would also apply to property distributions. In both instances, only 
the excess portion of any distribution would be treated as a liquidating distribution. 
 170. This distribution would be treated as a partial liquidating distribution under all of the 
method discussed supra note 165. Under the proportionate reduction method, C’s partnership 
interest would be reduced by one-half ((1−.2⁄.33) ⁄ (1−.2) = .5, where .33 equals C’s pre-
distribution partnership interest and .2 equals C’s post-distribution partnership interest). Likewise, 
using the value-based method, C’s distribution would reduce her interest in the partnership. 
Before the distribution, the fair market value of her partnership interest was $200 (1/3 of the $600 
fair market value of the partnership). When she receives a distribution of Orangeacre, with a fair 
market value of $100, the distribution would represent one-half of the overall fair market value of 
her partnership interest.  
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transaction in which C’s investment is terminated—would follow a 
recognition-based approach. 
3.  Taxing Liquidating Distributions 
A recognition-based approach is grounded in the principle that 
liquidating distributions are, in substance, taxable exchanges 
between partners and partnerships. A partnership transfers cash or 
property to a partner, and the partner relinquishes all or a portion of 
her interest in the partnership in exchange. When viewed in this 
light, liquidating distributions are straightforward property 
dispositions, giving rise to recognized gain at the partner level. 
The tax treatment of the distributee partner would follow a 
recognition rule, with the liquidating distribution triggering the 
recognition of any built-in gain reflected in her partnership interest. 
In order to determine the amount and character of such gain, this 
proposal adopts the full fragmentation method.171 Under full 
fragmentation, the partnership entity would be disregarded, and the 
distributee partner would be treated as disposing of her interest in 
each individual item of partnership property in a fully taxable 
transaction.172 This method is thus grounded in the aggregate theory 
of partnerships, where each partner is considered a direct co-owner 
of a portion of each item of partnership property.173 Put another way, 
 
 171. See Postlewaite et al., supra note 11, at 604–06. Other scholars have proposed taxing 
partnership distributions, but these proposals rely on alternative methods of determining the tax 
consequences to the distributee partner. See Berger, supra note 11, at 109 (proposing that 
Congress follow the corporate approach and adopt provisions treating disproportionate 
distributions like stock redemptions); Gergen, supra note 11, at 213–20 (proposing an accounts-
based approach to partnership distributions, where a partner would recognize gain on a 
distribution in excess of her share of the partnership’s accumulated earnings or debt). 
 172. This approach is similar to subchapter K’s current treatment of sales of partnership 
interests, which follows a partial fragmentation approach. I.R.C. §§ 741, 751(a). As a general 
matter, sales of partnership interests follow the entity theory of partnerships. The sale of a 
partnership interest is treated like a sale of stock in a corporation; the selling partner is treated as 
if she sold an interest in the partnership entity itself, and any gain recognized on the sale is treated 
as a capital gain. Id. § 741. Consistent with its historic concerns about character conversions, 
however, Congress subjected these sales to a “look-through” rule, which uses partial 
fragmentation to prevent the conversion of ordinary income into capital gains. Id. § 751(a). In 
general terms, the partial fragmentation method requires a partnership to first identify its hot 
assets. Id. § 751(c), (d). To the extent that any portion of the purchase price is attributable to the 
sale of the partner’s share of these hot assets, the selling partner’s recognized gain is treated as 
ordinary income rather than capital gain. Id. § 751(a). For a more detailed discussion of sales of 
partnership interests and the use of the partial fragmentation method, see generally MCKEE ET 
AL., supra note 10, ¶ 17; WILLIS & POSTLEWAITE, supra note 54, ¶ 12.02. 
 173. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. 
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full fragmentation looks through the partnership and assesses the 
consequences of a liquidating distribution on a property-by-property 
basis. In doing so, full fragmentation would best implement 
subchapter K’s equitable priorities—it would preserve the amount 
and character of each partner’s share of the partnership’s pre-
distribution built-in gains.174 
Operationally, full fragmentation would follow the same basic 
approach as was applied to the partnership’s distribution of 
property.175 It would treat the partnership as if it had entered into a 
hypothetical sale of all its property immediately before the 
distribution. To the extent that the partnership would have allocated 
any hypothetical gains to the distributee partner, the full 
fragmentation method would require her to recognize these gains as 
part of the liquidating distribution. Likewise, the character of these 
recognized gains would be determined based on the hypothetical 
sale. Because this is a fully taxable transaction, the distributee 
partner would take a basis in any distributed property equal to its fair 
market value. 
As a final step in the exchange, the partnership would adjust the 
basis of its remaining property to reflect any gains recognized by the 
distributee partner. This would be necessary to ensure that the post-
distribution built-in gain in the partnership’s property, as reflected in 
the difference between value and basis, only includes the remaining 
partners’ share of the partnership’s pre-distribution built-in gain.176 
Put another way, increasing the partnership’s basis by the amount of 
gain recognized by the distributee partner would ensure that the 
remaining partners are not subsequently taxed on the distributee 
partner’s share of any pre-distribution built-in gain. This basis 
adjustment would thus serve a critical role in a recognition-based 
approach, preserving the amount and character of the non-distributee 
partners’ respective shares of pre-distribution built-in gain. 
There is, however, one practical wrinkle in applying the full 
fragmentation method to liquidating distributions, relating to the 
 
 174. See infra note 182 and accompanying text. 
 175. See supra Part III.A.1.  
 176. For capital account purposes, the treatment of the distributee partner should mirror the 
tax treatment. To the extent that distributee partner recognizes any economic gain on the 
exchange, the book value of the partnership’s remaining property should be increased 
accordingly. In doing so, partnership rebookings would no longer be necessary in order to address 
the changes resulting from a liquidating distribution. 
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treatment of partial liquidating distributions. To that end, let’s return 
to the ABC partnership’s distribution of Orangeacre to C in partial 
liquidation of her partnership interest, which provides a useful 
illustration. Because the distribution of Orangeacre would not 
completely liquidate C’s partnership interest, she would remain a 
partner in the partnership following the transaction. It is thus 
necessary to split C’s partnership interest into two separate interests 
when applying the full fragmentation method; C would redeem one 
partnership interest in the partial liquidating distribution, and she 
would retain the other partnership interest. 
As previously discussed, C relinquished one-half of her 
partnership interest in this distribution, reducing her interest from 
one-third to one-fifth.177 The partnership would thus divide C’s 
interest accordingly, using the percentage change in her partnership 
interest to determine the value and basis of the liquidated and 
retained interests. As a result, C would be deemed to liquidate one-
half of her partnership interest in the partial liquidating distribution. 
The full fragmentation method would treat C as if she held two 
partnership interests, each with a fair market value of $100 and a 
basis of $85.178 And one of these interests would be redeemed in the 
liquidating distribution.  
Applying the full fragmentation method, C would be treated as 
if she received Orangeacre and, in exchange, relinquished a portion 
of her interest in the partnership’s remaining property—the cash and 
Inventory—in a fully taxable transaction. C would recognize a $15 
ordinary gain on this exchange. The gain would be determined based 
on the partnership’s hypothetical sale of the Inventory for its fair 
market value of $100 immediately before the distribution. The 
partnership would recognize a $90 ordinary gain on this fictional 
 
 177. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
 178. Immediately before the liquidating distribution, C held a single partnership interest with 
a fair market value of $200 and a basis of $170 ($160 original basis plus $10 share of gain 
recognized in connection with Orangeacre’s distribution). This outside basis of $170 takes into 
account the partnership’s recognition of gain on Orangeacre’s distribution, which is discussed 
supra Part III.A.1. There is thus a $30 built-in gain in this single pre-distribution partnership 
interest, and such built-in gain is attributable to the Inventory. When the partnership interest is 
divided into two equal partnership interests—one to be liquidated and one to be retained—each 
partnership interest has a fair market value of $100 ($200 fair market value of single interest * ½) 
and an outside basis of $85 ($170 basis of single interest * ½). Accordingly, each of these 
partnership interests has a built-in gain of $15 ($100 fair market value of divided interest less $85 
outside basis). 
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sale, and it would allocate the gain equally among the partners, $30 
each.179 C’s $30 share of this gain would then be divided between 
her two partnership interests based on their relative values. In this 
instance, the liquidated partnership interest and the retained 
partnership interest are of equal value; thus, a $15 ordinary gain 
would be allocated to C’s liquidated partnership interest. The 
partnership, in turn, would increase its basis in the Inventory by $15, 
from $10 to $25, to reflect C’s recognized gain. Likewise, C would 
take a basis of $100 in Orangeacre, reflecting its fair market value at 
the time of the exchange.180 
After the liquidating distribution, the partnership would have the 
following balance sheet: 
 
Assets Basis Value Capital Basis  Value 
      
Cash 400 400 A 170 200 
Inventory   25 100 B 170 200 
   C 85 100 
Total 425 500  425 500 
 
 
C would now have a one-fifth interest in the partnership, and A’s and 
B’s respective interests would increase to two-fifths.181 Going 
forward, the partnership would allocate all taxable items—including 
items attributable to the Inventory—using this post-distribution 
sharing ratio. Put another way, the ABC partnership would 
essentially become a new partnership, operating on a clean slate 
without any need to look back to its pre-distribution history. 
 
 179. The Inventory would be sold for $100, when its basis was $10; hence, the partnership 
would recognize a $90 ordinary gain on the hypothetical sale. I.R.C. § 1001 (2006). 
 180. This exchange would have no effect on C’s retained partnership interest. Her outside 
basis in the retained interest would thus remain $85. 
 181. Immediately after the liquidating distribution to C, the partnership would hold assets 
with an aggregate fair market value of $500. C would hold a partnership interest with a fair 
market value of $100; hence, she holds a one-fifth interest in the partnership. A and B, in contrast, 
would each hold partnership interests worth $200. Accordingly, their respective partnership 
interests reflect a two-fifths interest in the partnership. 
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Of equal importance, the full fragmentation method would 
preserve the amount and character of each partner’s share of the 
Inventory’s pre-distribution built-in gain. Before the distribution, 
there was $90 of built-in gain in the Inventory, and each partner’s 
share of this gain was $30. The partial liquidating distribution to C 
would not alter these shares; each partner would either recognize her 
respective share, or such share would be preserved for future 
recognition on the partnership’s sale of the Inventory. 
Consider A and B, the non-distributee partners. If the partnership 
were to sell the Inventory following the distribution, it would 
recognize a $75 ordinary gain, reflecting the difference between the 
property’s fair market value of $100 and its basis of $25. The 
partnership would allocate this gain among the partners based on 
their post-distribution sharing arrangement. A and B would thus each 
be allocated two-fifths, or $30, of this ordinary gain, consistent with 
their pre-distribution shares of the Inventory’s built-in gain. The 
same would be true for C. She would be allocated one-fifth, or $15, 
of ordinary gain on the partnership’s sale of the Inventory. When 
combined with the $15 of ordinary gain that she recognized on the 
distribution, the full fragmentation method would properly account 
for C’s $30 share of the Inventory’s pre-distribution built-in gain. 
B.  A New Day for Partnership Distributions 
A recognition-based approach to liquidating distributions would 
be transformative, modernizing and rationalizing subchapter K’s 
treatment of these ubiquitous transactions. By recasting liquidating 
distributions as taxable exchanges between partnerships and their 
partners, this approach would align the tax treatment of liquidating 
distributions with their commercial reality. 
A recognition-based approach would focus attention on the 
defining aspect of liquidating distributions—the severing of 
investment ties between partners and property. Liquidating 
distributions mark the end of an investment relationship, thus 
signaling that tax deferral is no longer appropriate.182 Considered in 
 
 182. In arguing for a recognition-based approach to partnership distributions, one scholar 
described a distributee partner’s decision to retain distributed property as a new investment 
decision, one warranting current taxation. Postlewaite et al., supra note 11, at 597–98. To 
Professor Postlewaite, a distributee partner has several options on receipt of a liquidating 
distribution: she can sell the distributed property for its fair market value; she can borrow against 
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this light, a recognition rule simply implements the foundational 
principle that a transaction’s tax consequences should match its 
corresponding economic consequences. 
Nonetheless, a recognition-based approach to distributions may 
initially seem like a radical realignment of subchapter K’s 
distribution system. Yet the shift is largely expressive, reflecting the 
evolving role of recognition in partnership distributions. As 
previously discussed, nonrecognition in partnership distributions has 
never been absolute, and Congress has increasingly turned to 
recognition-based anti-abuse provisions in its efforts to combat 
abusive distributions.183 The fight against tax shelters has already 
eroded Congress’s commitment to nonrecognition in partnership 
distributions. Accordingly, a recognition-based approach is best 
viewed as the culmination of decades of governmental activity, not 
as a revolutionary break with the past.184 
This approach, however, would mark a new day for partnership 
distributions. A recognition-based approach would bypass most, if 
not all, of the traditional challenges of partnership distributions. In 
doing so, it would raise promising possibilities, offering the hope of 
a simpler, more equitable, and more stable system of partnership 
distributions. 
 
such property; or, if she had preferred, the distributee partner could have requested that the 
partnership make her a distribution in cash, rather than property. Id. at 597. These options serve to 
highlight the partner’s changing investment and, in turn, the propriety of a recognition-based 
approach. Indeed, Professor Postlewaite would treat the distributee partner as if she “had sold [her 
partnership] interest for cash and had subsequently purchased the assets, or had received cash and 
had thereafter purchased them.” Id. at 598. 
 183. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 184. A recognition-based approach is also consistent with the larger trend toward entity 
treatment in the taxation of business enterprises. The 1986 repeal of the General Utilities doctrine 
had a profound impact on the treatment of corporate distributions and the taxation of business 
entities, more broadly. Tax Reform Act of 1986, PUB. L. NO. 99-514, § 631, 100 Stat. 2085, 2272 
(codified at I.R.C. § 311(b)). Although a detailed discussion of the treatment of distributions 
under subchapters C and S is beyond this Article’s scope, the provisions governing corporate 
distributions are grounded in a recognition premise. See generally BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. 
EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶¶ 8.21, 9, 10 
(7th ed. 2000); JAMES S. EUSTICE & JOEL D. KUNTZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF S 
CORPORATIONS ¶¶ 8, 13 (4th ed. 2001). There is no reason why this trend toward recognition 
should not extend into subchapter K. See supra note 156; see, e.g., Lokken, Future Without 
Subchapter K, supra note 5, at 270 (“This [recognition] principle applies to S Corporations, as 
well as C Corporations, establishing a history of gain recognition on distributions by pass-through 
entities.”). 
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Simplification would be the most immediate benefit of this 
approach to partnership distributions.185 These reforms would 
streamline the number and complexity of subchapter K’s distribution 
provisions. Because a recognition rule would prevent partnerships 
from using distributions as vehicles for tax sheltering, subchapter K 
would no longer require an arsenal of anti-abuse provisions.186 Nor 
would it require the secondary provisions that currently support these 
anti-abuse provisions.187 Congress could thus dismantle large swaths 
of subchapter K’s complicated distribution system. 
A recognition-based approach would also strip away much of 
subchapter K’s operational technicality. As previously discussed, the 
distribution system’s complexity is driven, in part, by rule design, 
with Congress trying to reconcile flexibility and equity through 
intricate and targeted provisions.188 By sacrificing nonrecognition, 
and therefore flexibility, Congress would be able to recalibrate the 
design of these provisions, clearing a path toward a more accessible 
distribution system. Indeed, a recognition-based approach would 
track a widely understood model—the general tax treatment of 
property dispositions.189 In doing so, partnerships would face a 
simpler, more rational distribution system. 
Alongside simplification, a recognition-based approach would 
better serve subchapter K’s equitable goals, preventing partnerships 
from using distributions as vehicles for character conversions, 
income shifting, and income avoidance. It would achieve this result 
by ensuring that a distribution does not affect the amount or 
character of any partner’s share of the partnership’s pre-distribution 
built-in gains. These amounts would either be recognized at the time 
of distribution or preserved for future recognition by the appropriate 
partner on a future sale of the partnership’s property. 
 
 185. See AM. LAW INST., MEMORANDUM NO. 3, supra note 11, at 78 (“Administratively, 
[recognition] would be the simplest option—no inside basis adjustments on a distribution, no 
allocation problems . . . no need for Section 751(b)”); Burke, supra note 7, at 699 (noting that a 
recognition-based approach “is simpler than existing section 751(b). It would ensure that the 
partners’ post-distribution tax capital accounts and shares of [built-in gain] generally correspond 
to their continuing percentage interests, thereby simplifying partnership accounting.”). 
 186. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 704(c)(1)(B), 707(a)(2)(B), 731(a)(2), 734(b), 735, 737, 751(b) 
(2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f)(5)(ii). 
 187. See, e.g., supra note 126. 
 188. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 189. Additionally, taxing partnership distributions of property would track the entity-level 
treatment of corporate distributions since the 1986 repeal of General Utilities. See supra note 155. 
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Likewise, these reforms would promote vertical equity norms. A 
recognition-based approach would ameliorate the burden borne by 
the many well-intentioned partnerships currently forced to navigate a 
discordant system designed for the small number of partnerships 
pursuing tax shelters. It would thus allow these everyday 
partnerships to focus on their primary objective—the commercial 
needs of their enterprise—instead of subchapter K’s distribution 
system. 
A recognition-based approach would also introduce much-
needed stability into partnership distributions. Despite the prevalence 
of these distributions, their tax treatment remains surprisingly 
uncertain. A recognition-based approach would change this, creating 
a coherent system of taxation grounded in the premise that 
liquidating distributions are taxable property dispositions. Everything 
in this reconstituted system, from organizing principles to individual 
provisions, would derive from this one premise. A harmonious 
foundation, in turn, would allow partnerships to “see” how 
distributions work, hence improving their ability to apply the law and 
adapt it to novel distributions as they arise. 
All together, a recognition-based approach would foster 
simplicity, equity, and stability in partnership distributions. Yet, the 
benefits of a reformed distribution system would extend beyond 
subchapter K. Most immediately, compliance would improve across 
the partnership spectrum. At one extreme, well-intentioned 
partnerships would be able to understand and apply these reformed 
provisions without the expenditure of excessive resources. At the 
other extreme, sheltering partnerships would find a recognition-based 
approach more costly and more difficult to manipulate. Indeed, it 
would deny these partnerships the two items that have proven 
instrumental in their pursuit of tax shelters: subchapter K’s current 
technical, yet porous, provisions, and the shield created by the 
noncompliance of everyday partnerships. 
Improved compliance, in turn, would increase government 
revenues and nurture a sense of public legitimacy in subchapter K. A 
new cycle would emerge in partnership distributions: a recognition-
based approach would promote simplicity, equity, and stability in 
distributions; improved functionality would foster compliance and 
public legitimacy; and a growing sense of fairness would further 
reinforce the system’s first principles of simplicity, equity, and 
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stability. Eliminating nonrecognition would thus clear the path to a 
better and more harmonious system of partnership distributions. 
C.  Some Objections 
Any proposal for reforming partnership distributions is likely to 
give rise to debate and criticism, and a recognition-based approach is 
no exception. This subpart addresses several possible objections to 
this proposal, concluding that none offers a compelling argument 
against subchapter K’s reform. On the contrary, these potential 
objections provide a final opportunity to consider the desirability of a 
recognition-based approach to partnership distributions. 
1.  Recognition as Market Chilling 
A critic might object to this proposal’s rejection of 
nonrecognition, which is often considered a cornerstone of 
partnership taxation. To this critic, nonrecognition promotes the 
flexibility and informality that have historically defined subchapter 
K; thus, the shift to a recognition-based approach would 
fundamentally alter the nature of partnership distributions.190 In 
doing so, a recognition rule might jeopardize the popularity of 
subchapter K and chill the market for partnership transactions.191 
This potential objection is overstated. As previously discussed, 
recognition is not unknown in partnership distributions; subchapter K 
has always included recognition-based anti-abuse provisions.192 
Throughout subchapter K’s history, Congress has increasingly turned 
to recognition rules to combat abusive distributions. Today, “many 
partnership distributions are not nonrecognition events.”193 
 
 190. See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., MEMORANDUM NO. 3, supra note 11, at 78; Burke, supra note 
11, at 680; Ernst & Young LLP, supra note 153; Rebecca S. Rudnick, Enforcing the 
Fundamental Premises of Partnership Taxation, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 229, 359 (1993). 
 191. See, e.g., Burke, supra note 11, at 680; Ernst & Young LLP, supra note 153; Jackson et 
al., 1954 American Law Institute Draft, supra note 64, at 154. 
 192. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 193. See Yin, supra note 5, at 226. In addition, there are likely large numbers of distributions 
that should be treated as recognition events under current law, but are erroneously treated as 
nonrecognition transactions by partnerships. In many of these instances, the culprit may be 
subchapter K’s distribution system itself, with its complicated arsenal of anti-abuse provisions. 
Considered in this light, the increased number of partnership distributions that would be taxed 
under a recognition-based approach may be misleading. A portion of this “increase” would stem 
from improved compliance, rather than a foundational change in the law. 
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Even so, a recognition-based approach to distributions would 
accelerate the recognition of gain by some partners. Yet this would 
be appropriate. Nonrecognition is not justified in transactions where 
a partner’s or a partnership’s investment in property is terminated.194 
Notwithstanding the cost of any accelerated gain recognition, 
there is little reason to believe that a recognition-based approach to 
distributions would chill the market for commercial partnership 
transactions.195 As previously discussed, liquidating distributions are 
often driven by personal considerations or commercial 
imperatives.196 Although tax planning may play an important role in 
structuring these transactions, it is a secondary role. Likewise, the 
administrative cost savings of a streamlined distribution system 
should offset some portion of the additional tax costs. This 
proposal’s administrative savings would thus further diminish the 
potential deterrent effect of a recognition rule. 
2.  Recognition as Counterproductive 
A critic might also argue that the shift to a recognition-based 
approach would be counterproductive from a complexity perspective, 
 
 194. See supra Part II.D.1. Much of the scholarly debate regarding nonrecognition in 
subchapter K has taken place in the context of partnership contributions, rather than partnership 
distributions. See, e.g., Burke, supra note 112, at 522–29; Laura E. Cunningham & Noël B. 
Cunningham, Simplifying Subchapter K: The Deferred Sales Method, 51 SMU L. REV. 1 (1997); 
Keyser, supra note 112; Andrea R. Monroe, Saving Subchapter K: Substance, Shattered Ceilings, 
and the Problem of Contributed Property, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1381 (2009); John P. Steines, 
Partnership Allocations of Built-In Gain or Loss, 45 TAX LAW REV. 615, 653–55 (1990). 
Whatever one’s view of the merits of nonrecognition in partnership contributions, it is important 
to consider partnership distributions separately. Indeed, the policy rationales supporting 
nonrecognition appear far less strong in the partnership distribution context. See Berger, supra 
note 11, at 154–55 (“[A]fter the business is under way, there is little purpose in continued 
nonrecognition when the venture disposes of business assets by returning them to the investors. 
And, if the distribution is pursuant to a liquidation, the case of nonrecognition virtually disappears 
as the conversion of an ongoing business from a partnership to a sole proprietorship rarely 
occurs.”); Burke, supra note 112, at 534 (“Deferral of gain or loss inherent in the distributee’s 
share of partnership assets should not be permitted for a non-pro rata distribution, since the 
distributee has effectively terminated his interest in a portion of the partnership’s underlying 
assets and should be taxed accordingly.”); Lokken, supra note 5, at 270 (“Requiring recognition 
on distribution is probably less disruptive of legitimate business operations than would be 
recognition on contribution.”); Postlewaite et al., supra note 11, at 597–98; Yin, supra note 5, at 
226. 
 195. A recognition-based approach may adversely affect the popularity of subchapter K with 
sheltering partnerships. That, however, should be considered a strength, not a weakness, of this 
proposal. 
 196. See Burke, supra note 11, at 727; Yin, supra note 5, at 226; see also supra notes 31–32 
and accompanying text. 
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simply replacing one challenging system of taxing distributions with 
another. This critic might note that a recognition rule relies on 
mechanics—line drawing between distributions and full 
fragmentation—that have been considered and rejected in the past, in 
part, because of their complexity.197 Accordingly, this approach 
might prove too complicated for modern partnerships, undermining 
its simplification goals. 
In truth, complexity objections seem more nostalgic than 
substantive. No distribution system can eliminate complexity 
entirely; partnership distributions, particularly liquidating 
distributions, are too challenging. Yet a recognition-based approach 
is distinctive in its potential to streamline subchapter K. By 
eliminating nonrecognition in partnership distributions, this proposal 
addresses the problem instead of its symptoms, clearing a path to a 
simpler, more stable distribution system. 
Nonetheless, this objection overstates the potential complexity 
of a recognition-based approach. In both theory and practice, this 
recognition-based approach focuses on commercial reality, 
proposing reforms that would conform the tax treatment of 
distributions to their economic substance.198 Redefining distributions, 
for example, would reflect the fundamental commercial differences 
between operating distributions and liquidating distributions.199 In 
 
 197. See, e.g., Burke, supra note 11, at 680; Jackson et al., Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 
supra note 64, at 1211. 
 198. A related objection to a recognition-based approach to distributions focuses on the 
administrative costs of a recognition rule, in particular the costs associated with valuing 
partnership interests and partnership property. However, it is likely that many partnerships 
already value their property in connection with distributions. See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 11, at 
210–11 (“[T]axing gains on asset distributions and redemptions of interests by partners imposes 
some new administrative duties, but the additional administrative burden should be small since 
most of the relevant information (for example, the value of a partner’s capital account, the value 
of the distributed asset, and the value of other assets) already must be produced.”); Postlewaite et 
al., supra note 11, at 598–99. If, for example, a partnership elects to rebook its property as part of 
a liquidating distribution, the rules governing the rebooking process require the partnership to 
revalue its property. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f)(1). Likewise, as a commercial matter, a 
partnership may be required to value all of its property in order to determine the fair market value 
of a retiring partner’s partnership interest. See Postlewaite et al., supra note 11, at 598–99. 
 199. Line drawing in partnership distributions focuses attention on the question of the proper 
tax treatment of partially liquidating distributions. This question has proven quite controversial 
among partnership tax scholars. Compare Andrews, supra note 7, at 43 (recommending a 
“bifurcation” approach to partial liquidating distributions, where the distributee partner is treated 
as holding two partnership interests—a liquidated partnership interest and a retained partnership 
interest), Karen C. Burke, Taxing Hot Asset Shifts, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 327, 355 (2007), Burke, 
supra note 153, at 171, and Postlewaite et al., supra note 11, at 598, with AM. LAW INST., 
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doing so, it would free Congress to design a comprehensive 
distribution system that taxes liquidating distributions as what they 
are—taxable property dispositions. A streamlined distribution 
system, in turn, would better resonate with partnerships, allowing 
them to more easily navigate partnership distributions and their 
inevitable challenges. 
Likewise, taxing distributions is not a novel concept. 
Partnerships have considerable experience with recognition rules in 
the distribution context.200 Partnerships also have experience with 
fragmentation; the rules governing the tax treatment of sales of 
partnership interests rely on a partial fragmentation method.201 More 
generally, however, recognition is the baseline for property 
transactions throughout the federal income tax. Partnerships may 
thus rely on their most basic knowledge of general tax principles in 
navigating a reformed recognition-based distribution system. 
3.  Recognition as Futile 
A third potential objection to a recognition-based approach 
focuses on the futility of reforming partnership distributions. This 
critic would assert that a recognition rule would not prevent tax 
abuse. If distributions no longer provided tax-advantaged results, 
then wealthy and well-advised partnerships would simply find 
alternative means of deferring tax.202 
This objection proves too much, calling into question any 
recognition-based effort to combat abusive distributions, including 
 
MEMORANDUM NO. 3, supra note 11, at 55–58, Jackson et al., Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 
supra note 64, at 145–46 (explaining that special rules for partial liquidating distributions are 
difficult and rarely needed), Massey, supra note 153 (describing a speech given by William 
McKee in which a partial liquidation rule was described as a “stealth bomber proposal” that 
“radically changed the theory of subchapter K”), and Yin, supra note 5, at 229. 
 200. See supra Part II.C.2.  
 201. I.R.C. §§ 741, 751(a) (2006). For a more detailed discussion of the partial fragmentation 
approach that applies to sales of partnership interests, see supra note 172. Additionally, section 
1411 adopts a fragmentation approach when determining a taxpayers’ net investment income 
subject to tax. I.R.C. § 1411(c)(4). For purposes of this provision, net investment income includes 
any net gain attributable to the disposition of an active interest in a partnership. Id. 
§ 1411(c)(1)(A)(iii). In order to compute this amount, the partnership is deemed to sell all of its 
assets for their fair market value immediately before the disposition of the taxpayer’s partnership 
interest. Id. § 1411(c)(4)(A). Any gains allocated to the partner on this hypothetical sale must be 
included in the computation of her net investment income. Id. 
 202. See AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT—TAXATION OF PASS-THROUGH 
ENTITIES: MEMORANDUM NO. 2, 72–73 (1996); Burke, supra note 11, at 727–28. 
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the current law’s array of anti-abuse rules.203 At the same time, it 
ignores all of the abusive distributions that a recognition-based 
approach would eliminate. Even so, I do not mean to suggest that 
concern about disguised distributions is without merit; the ease with 
which a partnership might achieve comparable results through an 
alternative transaction is an important consideration in rethinking 
subchapter K’s distribution system. But it is neither a new concern, 
nor a concern unique to partnership taxation. Disguised transactions 
are a universal problem in the federal income tax and, hence, 
solutions relying on general tax principles might prove promising in 
addressing abusive distributions.204 It is indeed hard to imagine that 
the application of general tax principles would produce worse results 
than subchapter K’s current system of taxing partnership 
distributions. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
This Article offers an alternative vision of partnership 
distributions, drawing its inspiration from an unexpected source—the 
inimitable section 751(b) disproportionate distribution rule. 
Partnership distributions are deeply flawed, and the time has come to 
rethink everything about these ubiquitous transactions, beginning 
with the nonrecognition premise at the system’s foundation. This 
Article thus reimagines partnership distributions liberated from 
nonrecognition, proposing a system grounded in commercial reality, 
where liquidating distributions would be treated as taxable exchanges 
between the partnership and the distributee partner. 
 
 203. As one partnership tax scholar presciently noted: “It may seem somewhat opportunistic 
to defend the permissiveness of the distribution rules on the ground that stricter rules would be 
self-defeating due to their easy avoidability. Indeed, dissatisfaction with the flexibility of 
partnership allocations generally, as well as with the perceived shortcomings of the disguised sale 
rules, may fuel more radical proposals to curb the permissiveness of the distribution rules.” 
Burke, supra note 11, at 728. 
 204. Indeed, sharing responsibility for abusive distributions with provisions outside 
subchapter K would serve an expressive function, reflecting the reality of modern partnerships. 
The activities of partnerships that pursue tax shelters are unpredictable, and their transactions are 
increasingly individualized. Even worse, the current law has proven problematic for the large 
number of partnerships that are not engaged in tax shelters themselves, but are nonetheless forced 
to bear the complexity of subchapter K’s formidable distribution system. In the increasingly 
polarized world of partnership taxation, it may simply no longer be possible (if it ever was) to 
design functional provisions that prevent the abusive distributions of sheltering partnerships and 
simultaneously promote the legitimate commercial interests of non-sheltering partnerships. 
TAXING REALITY 10/7/2014 6:48 PM 
2014] TAXING REALITY 729 
With recognition guiding our thinking about partnership 
distributions, transformative changes would become possible. 
Aligning the tax treatment of distributions with their economic 
substance would streamline the system, reducing the number and 
complexity of subchapter K’s distribution provisions. At the same 
time, a recognition rule would prevent abuse by cutting off deferral 
at the time of distribution. Reduced complexity and abuse, in turn, 
would lead to greater stability in partnership distributions, with 
partnerships able to see the system applying equally to all 
partnerships, regardless of their income or sophistication levels. 
Taken together, a recognition-based approach would thus improve 
the functionality of partnership distributions, taking important steps 
toward simplicity, equity, and stability in subchapter K. 
Reforming partnership distributions offers a unique lens through 
which to consider the larger project of rethinking partnership 
taxation. Distributions are distinctively situated in subchapter K, 
standing at the intersection of its many provisions, abuses, and 
dysfunctions. Distributions are thus the perfect incubator for thinking 
deeply about partnership taxation and its future. Indeed, solving the 
problem of partnership distributions may clear a path to more 
comprehensive reforms in this important, but under-theorized, area 
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